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I. INTRODUCTION
The world is awash in refugees.1 According to the most recent estimates,
more than fifteen million individuals are already outside their countries and in
need of international protection and assistance.' This population, already
immense, is growing steadily and remorselessly with the proliferation of
refugee-producing and migration-facilitating conditions: political repression,
armed conflict, civil strife, environmental disaster, famine, social and economic
disintegration, wretched governmental policies, and improvements in
communications and transportation opportunities.' Refugee emergencies have
become so endemic that the rhetoric of crisis today is as likely to numb as it is
to energize.4
The current legal and political arrangements for managing refugee flows
were established to manage European cross-border refugee flows during the
post-World War II era. The cause of these flows became much more varied as
time went on, their locus shifted during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to other
1. The word "refugees," of course, carries several different meanings. In this Article, I shall
generally use the word in its broadest connotation to characterize individuals who have fled their country
for one reason or another and believe that they cannot or should not return to it in the near future, although
they may hope to do so if conditions permit. In this usage, the category is narrower than both "migrants"
(whom I think of simply as people on the move) and "immigrants" (who have left their country intending
to reside permanently in some other country). It is much broader, however, than the technical legal category
of refugee defined in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, para A, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, 152 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention], and in U.S. immigration law, see 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) (1994). When I write of refugees in what follows, I mean to use the term in its broader,
nonlegal connotation except when the context indicates the contrary.
2. WorldRefugee Statistics, WoRWDREFuGEESuRvEY: 1995 INREvmw (1996), at3, 4 tbl.1. Many
millions more are internally displaced. See id. at 6 tbl.3. Other estimates vary. The New York 7imes reports
a February 1995 count by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimating that
23 million refugees had crossed borders and another 26 million were displaced in their own countries.
According to this report, "I in every 115 people on earth is now on the run or in some kind of exile."
Barbara Crossette, This Is No Place Like Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at D3. On the other hand,
Immigration Review reports that UNHCR recognizes 14.4 million refugees, down 25% from the 18.2
million classified as refugees in 1993. 24 IMMIGR. REv., Winter 1996, at 7, 7. I shall not attempt to
reconcile these figures; even the lowest estimates present an immense human tragedy and awesome policy
challenge.
3. A recent empirical study of the sources and causes of refugee flows to the United States indicates
that these factors have changed significantly in the last quarter century. Wars and political persecution (other
than from ethnic conflicts) are less important causes of refugee flows than they were in 1969. Although the
number of countries and conflicts generating refugee flows has changed little since then, what has principally
changed is the number of refugees per conflict, which in turn reflects increasing levels of violence per
conflict due to the growth in antipersonnel mines and small arms weapons. The rise in the number of
refugees per conflict remains even after one controls for population growth and easier transportation. For
purposes of the present discussion, the most important implications of the increased violence and the kinds
of weapons employed are that they have multiplied the total refugee flow and made repatriation of refugees
much more difficult. See Myron Weiner, Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes
of Refugee Flows, 1969-1992, in MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND FOREiGN POUCY: U.S. AND GERMAN POuclES
TowARD CouT~iEs OF ORIGIN (Rainer Munz & Myron Weiner eds., forthcoming 1997).
4. The notion of "compassion fatigue" was coined during the 1970s to reflect this psychological
reality. Only this can account for the current passivity of the Clinton administration with respect to the
appalling refugee crisis in eastern Zaire. See lain Guest, How and When To Intervene for Humanity,
CHRISTIAN Sca. MoNrrOR, Dec. 2, 1996, at 19 (noting that American failure to define policy in Zaire leaves
desperate refugees trapped).
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regions, notably Africa, south and southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the
Caribbean, and internally displaced individuals became more numerous than the
border-crossing refugees.' By the 1980s, Europe had come to think of the
refugee burden as more of a problem for the Third World and the United States
than for itself. Protected from large-scale refugee movements by an
impregnable Iron Curtain in the east, Europe seemed relatively immune to the
threat.
It is no longer possible to entertain this comforting illusion. With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Germany's reunification, the militarization of
bitter ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, and the failure of many former European
colonies to establish viable political and economic systems, refugees are once
again pouring into the very heart of Europe. Moreover, new migration routes,
facilitated by cheap transportation and intricate social networks, are bringing
migrants to Europe (and thence to the United States) from Asia, Africa, and the
Pacific archipelago.6 Although few of these migrants are likely to meet the legal
qualifications for Convention refugee status,1 many of them nevertheless seek
some form of temporary or permanent protection and must be processed in one
or another European state until their status can be determined-with the
attendant fiscal, social, and political burdens on the receiving state that such
processing ordinarily entails.' Europe thus joins the Third World, North
America (the United States and Canada), 9 and the other traditional receiving
5. On the growing predominance of the internally displaced, see Weiner, supra note 3.
6. See Raymond Bonner, New Road to West for Illegal Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at
A12.
7. The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person with a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country." 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, para. A(2). This
does not cover the bulk of migrants fleeing the conditions listed in the first paragraph of this Article.
8. The methods for processing refugees in Europe were harmonized in the Dublin Convention and
the Second Schengen Agreement. Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between
the Governments of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French
Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 84
[hereinafter 1985 Schengen Agreement]; Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining
Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15,
1990, 30 I.L.M. 427 [hereinafter 1990 Dublin Convention]. The 1990 Dublin Convention establishes
uniform procedures for processing asylum applicants, and the 1985 Schengen Agreement contains rules for
determining one "responsible state" to process each application. See James C. Hathaway, Harmonizing for
Whom? The Devaluation of Refugee Protection in the Era of European Economic Integration, 26 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 719, 722-28 (1993); Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and
the German Asylum Amendment, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 503, 506-09 (1993). By relegating asylum seekers to
one asylum application and adjudication in Europe, these agreements are likely to decrease the level of
refugee protection. The United States and Canada are planning to enter into a similar "country of first
arrival" agreement. See Canada, U.S. Release Joint Draft Agreement on Refugee Claims, 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1614 (1995).
9. Several recent developments in the United States might increase the pressures here, quite apart
from the more secular growth in refugee movements throughout the world that inevitably affect the United
States. These developments include the amendment of the statutory "refugee" definition to include
persecution for resistance to coercive population control methods, see Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 601, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)), the granting of some of tbe rapidly growing number of asylum applications from
Mexicans, see Sam Verhovek, In a Shift, U.S. Grants Asylum for 55 Mexicans, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1995,
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regions in facing the prospect of additional flows of migrants claiming
protection through the international refugee system, broadly defined.
Virtually all discussions of refugee law and policy focus on the acute
vulnerability of refugees. These commentators seek ways to alleviate refugees'
sufferings, either by fulfilling or extending the protections to which they are
entitled or by eliminating the political conditions that impel them to flee from
their homelands. The reason for this focus on the refugees themselves is as
obvious as it is sound and humane: Refugees present egregious cases of
injustice and compelling claims for some form of international protection. Their
claims are compelling not so much because they often live in conditions of
poverty, unemployment, rude shelter, and mistreatment. After all, these are the
conditions of daily life for most other human beings unfortunate enough to have
been born into the wrong social class in the wrong place at the wrong time.
These conditions are also those in which most refugees lived before their flight
made them objects of international law's concern. Instead, what marks refugees
off for particular solicitude is their radical, enforced dislocation and isolation
and their uncertain legal status as aliens. They are of special humanitarian
concern because they were compelled to abandon the only protections and
solaces that can render the harsh vicissitudes of life endurable: the assistance
(however minimal) of their own governments and the social supports of their
customary communities.
The perspective of this Article, however, is quite different. Rather than
focus on the suffering that refugees endure or the root causes of their flight, I
take these remorseless facts as tragically given. I emphasize instead the burdens
that the sudden, massive refugee flows that are now endemic impose on states.
I do so not because these burdens are more than the international order, taken
as a whole, can or should bear (they are not) but because I am convinced of the
following three propositions. First, the emerging state responses to these
burdens are seriously jeopardizing the viability of any meaningful regime of
international human rights protection. Second, any realistic solution to this
problem must somehow forestall these responses by easing these burdens in
exchange for a set of obligations that states are more willing to accept and
implement. Third, this can only be accomplished by distributing obligations
more widely and fairly among states over time.
Doubtless, my effort to salvage a meaningful human rights regime from the
carcass of state sovereignty will seem rather odd to many well-informed
commentators on refugee law and policy in the academy and in the field. They
often maintain that state sovereignty constitutes perhaps the chief threat and
at Al (citing increase in applications from 122 in 1990 to 6397 in 1993 to 9304 in 1995, while grants
increased from zero in 1993 to 54 in 1995), and the much-publicized grant of asylum to a woman from Togo
based on her fear of clitoridectomy, see In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. No. 3278 (B.I.A. 1996); Celia W.
Dugger, Board Hears Asylum Appeal in Genital-Mutilation Case, N.Y. Tims, May 3, 1996, at B5
(estimating that more than 85 million women in world are subject to clitoridectomy). On the other hand,
other provisions of IIRIRA adopted new procedures that are intended to restrict the availability of asylum.
See IIRJRA § 601 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158).
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impediment to the fulfillment of human rights goals. To them, state sovereignty
is the problem, not the solution.
This view is certainly plausible. After all, nation-states are today the
principal designers and executors of human rights violations. They also
encourage, abet, condone, or at least fail to prevent many human rights
violations committed by ostensibly private groups. Finally, the principle of state
sovereignty often delegitimates and stymies proposed interventions by states and
supranational groups into the offending state's territory-interventions that
might prevent or rectify violations occurring entirely within national borders.
In each of these ways, the nation-state has indeed impeded and confounded
human rights goals, just as its critics suggest. 10
This line of argument is true as far as it goes, but it does not go nearly far
enough. For it is also true that for the foreseeable future, genuine human rights
protections-particularly the protection of refugees-can only be enforced and
implemented by sovereign states or by other entities such as supranational
agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with their
assistance or sufferance. This is a brutal reality of which any practicable,
meaningful reform proposal must take full account. To ignore or deny it is to
engage in a dangerous fatuity.
But the link between sovereignty and protection is more than a regrettable
necessity. While malefactors have committed great crimes in the name of state
sovereignty, the nation-state has also been an essential, powerful force for
justice. The mature nation-state is a unique formation conceived through
communal imagination, cemented by history, fueled by political ideology, and
equilibrated by institutions. Its combination of scale, power, predictability, and
normativity enable it to generate levels of self-sacrifice and coordinated action
in the common interest of which other groupings, whether larger or smaller,
seem incapable.
But however one appraises the overall relationship between nation-states
and human rights, the analysis and proposal that follow are constructed on a
premise that few knowledgeable observers of the current refugee regime can
seriously dispute. My premise is that the current refugee regime is "broke"-in
the limited but important sense that it fails to afford adequate protection to the
enormous and growing number of people fleeing from what seem to be, and
often are, intolerable conditions-and that it needs fixing. This is not to deny
10. For recent examples of sovereignty skeptics, see JEAN-MAmE GUEHENNo, THE END OF THE
NATION-STATE (Victoria Elliot trans., 1995); DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION
AND THE DECLINE OF CrnzENSHIP (1996); YASEmiN N. SoYsAL, LInMTS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND
POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994); Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being
Propelled Towards a People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1993);
Aristide R. Zolberg, Changing Sovereignty Games and International Migration, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 153 (1994); see also David A. Martin, Effects of International Law on Migration Policy and Practice:
The Uses of Hypocrisy, 23 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 547, 548 (1989) (citing sources suggesting that doctrine
of sovereign discretion over immigration is fundamentally erroneous). A related genre of commentary on
sovereignty emphasizes its transcendence by economics-driven regionalism. See, e.g., KENICHI OHMAE, THE
END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE Op REGMNAL ECONOMIES (1995).
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the many important and often heroic responses that the international community
has mounted to address human rights emergencies. Indeed, I describe one such
response, the Comprehensive Plan of Action and Orderly Departure Program
in Southeast Asia (CPA), in some detail. It is simply to say that much more
needs to be done as these emergencies continue to proliferate.
This Article proceeds in several parts. In Part II, I discuss some of the
reasons why the current refugee protection regime is inadequate. In Part III, I
summarize the CPA experience, the most important example of a negotiated
refugee burden-sharing arrangement, which suggests both the value of
international burden-sharing quotas and the need to create a more reliable,
effective structure for prescribing and administering them.
In Part IV, I consider four broad strategies for improving refugee
protection. In the order of their abstract desirability, they are: (1) eliminating
the root causes of refugee flows; (2) prompt repatriation of refugees; (3)
temporary protection of refugees; and (4) permanent resettlement of refugees
in third countries." I conclude (with virtually all other commentators) that each
of these is problematic and that the practical realities of refugee crises and
international refugee politics often require resort to the strategies of temporary
protection and permanent resettlement because the more desirable ones are
simply not available.
In Part V, I describe my proposal, which is intended to ameliorate some,"
but certainly not all, of the most important inadequacies in the current system.
Details aside, the proposal consists of two main elements. First, a group of
states would agree to observe a strong norm of proportional burden-sharing for
refugees, would seek to induce other states to join the group, and would arrange
for an existing or newly-established international agency to assign to each
participating state a refugee protection quota. A state's quota would commit it
to assure temporary protection or permanent resettlement for a certain number
of refugees over a certain time period. Second, the participating states would
then be permitted to trade their quotas by paying others to fulfill their
obligations. As noted immediately below, states would participate in the quota-
cum-market system voluntarily, albeit under the influence of their more
powerful neighbors. Accordingly, the system should require only limited
regulation by the agency. As discussed in Section V.E, its chief responsibilities
would be to administer the system, including the quotas and the flow of
information about refugees, and to ascertain whether the requisite protection is
actually being delivered.
I propose that this scheme be entirely consensual on the part of the
participating states and that it be established on a regional or even a subregional
11. As noted below, "temporary" protection often turns out to be permanent. On the other hand,
refugees receiving "permanent" resettlement might-should conditions in their country of origin
change-later wish or (if they are not yet citizens) be required to repatriate. see infra notes 77-78 and
accompanying text.




basis, rather than on a global one. These states would define the refugees who
might look to them for protection according to agreed-upon criteria. For
example, the criteria might prefer refugees from countries of origin located in
the region, refugees in first-asylum states located there, or refugees from
countries with historical ties to participating states.
A regionally-structured system would possess several important advantages
over a more global one. It could exploit a tradition of regional responsibility for
localized refugee flows and solutions, the greater commonality of interests and
values that regions tend to share, and the more intense patterns of interaction
that they exhibit. It would minimize the psychological, fiscal, and other costs
of having to relocate refugees over long distances and of locating them farther
from their homes. Its limited size and consensual character would also make it
administratively more manageable. As with other groups seeking gains from
trade, however, participating states would have an incentive to expand the
membership over time if the scheme proved successful.13
I also discuss in Part V why this unusual burden-sharing scheme might
actually be politically acceptable and practically workable. Such a happy
outcome, however, is far from clear. Under the existing regime, after all, states
that are not states of origin or of first asylum are entirely free to join in, or
refrain from, refugee protection efforts, as their interests dictate. Why then
would they choose to surrender that freedom of action and accept a burden-
sharing obligation that is likely to be costly, risk domestic political tensions,
and probably ratchet upwards over time?
Some states will probably reject such an obligation out of hand; they will
point out that they neither generate refugee flows nor are likely to receive them.
They may also point to the fact that the kind of massive refugee flows that have
occurred in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are the exception, not the rule.
The larger, wealthier, and more stable states can often absorb smaller, more
gradual refugee movements without resorting to extraordinary measures.
Even these states, however, might be attracted to burden-sharing for the
same reason that many individuals are attracted to catastrophic health insurance:
States may rationally prefer to incur a small and predictable protection burden
now in order to avoid bearing large, sudden, unpredictable, unwanted, and
unstoppable refugee inflows in the future. They might prefer a system that
created strong incentives for more states to support temporary protection of
refugees, largely in the Third World, over the current one, which generates
13. One possible objection to organizing this proposal on a regional basis-that it would further
balkanize international relationships that are already divided along economic, racial, and ethnic lines for
which regions are proxies-seems weak. Regional bloc formation reflects large geopolitical and global
economic forces. Moreover, it is gradually giving way to a more integrated system, as suggested by the
recent expansions of NAFrA, MERCOSUR, NATO, the EU, and other groupings that were initially more
geographically limited than they are now, as well as by proposals to extend them further in the future. To
the extent that regional arrangements entail problems, my scheme is not intended to solve them. By
emphasizing the interdependence and mutual interests of different regions, however, it might even improve
their relationships, as mutually beneficial market transactions tend to do. The issue of discrimination by
states in the trading of protection quotas is discussed in infra text accompanying notes 148-49.
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strong pressures for an even more dreaded (from their perspective) form of
relief: permanent resettlement.
As the world grows smaller and more interconnected, and as an increasing
number of refugees can more easily reach more places and claim protection
there, such "refugee crisis insurance" might well be a "good buy"-perhaps
even for relatively insular states. By introducing a market in quota obligations,
the scheme would permit even greater flexibility. For many states, then, this
burden-sharing scheme would be fairer and more rational than the status
quo-especially if, as I propose, it were established on a regional basis. So, at
least, I shall argue.
Part V concludes by discussing how such a scheme would be enforced.
Briefly, I suggest that while the scheme would be administered and to some
extent enforced by an international agency, it is the states with the greatest
interest in a better refugee protection system-those in North America and
Western Europe-that would have the strongest incentives to deploy the various
carrots and sticks of international diplomacy at their disposal (trade benefits,
other forms of assistance, security guarantees, etc.) in order to secure both
initial agreement and subsequent compliance.
The United States has compelling reasons to seize the initiative on this
issue. As the only remaining superpower and the leading funder of the existing
international refugee system, it has the greatest stake in assuring a just and
stable world order. The Bosnian tragedy revealed a vacuum of leadership in
European refugee crises that only the United States can fill. Finally, the United
States continues to be vulnerable to its own sudden refugee flows from the
Caribbean, which it has experienced from time to time since 1980.
So far as I know, this proposal is a novel one-although it resembles in
some respects an approach adumbrated by Professor James C. Hathaway
several years ago," and its quotas feature seeks to build on the embryonic
burden-sharing norm that the CPA experience, detailed in Part M, exemplified.
Because the proposal will certainly be controversial in the refugee-policy
community, Part VI defends it against a variety of anticipated objections,
particularly to its market element, which is bound to arouse the most
opposition. At the outset, however, I wish to emphasize a point that should
inform one's reaction to the entire analysis. Although the proposal entails many
problems, virtually all of those problems already exist, sometimes to an even
greater degree, in the current system. For this reason, I urge the reader to keep
the "compared to what" question firmly in mind as she ponders these problems.
II. THE CURRENT REGIME FOR PROTECTING REFUGEES
The existing system of refugee protection is almost universally criticized
14. James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection, 4 J. REFUGEn
STUD. 113, 126-28 (1991) (proposing international protection system that removes national interdiction
schemes and directly involves international supervisory agency in protective measures taken pending
viability of safe return to state of origin).
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by those individuals and organizations most committed to human rights goals,15
and by governments that are affected by its functioning. The bill of particulars
in the various indictments converge in many respects. All commentators
recognize that the system was designed in the post-World War II era to deal
with a predominantly European displaced population facing prospects quite
different from those confronting today's refugees. Modem globalization of the
world economy, the revolutions in transportation and communications, and the
dissolution of colonial empires into a plethora of weak and often oppressive
states--changes so consequential for the magnitude and character of
contemporary refugee flows-all lay in the future.' 6
The system that developed is one in which each state of first asylum must
determine the status of the claimant-in particular, whether she qualifies as a
refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 7 If so,
she may be entitled as a matter of international, and perhaps domestic, law to
the panoply of rights that the Convention accords refugees.'"
From the perspective of refugees seeking protection, this system suffers
from a number of serious flaws. Since all of these flaws have already received
much attention and extensive critical analysis from refugee advocates,
international organizations, and scholars of international human rights law, I
shall discuss them only briefly. The core legal concepts embedded in the
refugee definition-persecution on account of race, religion, national origin,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group-are expansive and
ambiguous enough to have engendered enormous uncertainties when they are
applied to particular cases. On the other hand, these concepts are quite narrow
relative to the diverse circumstances and motives that may prompt individuals
to leave their countries in haste and in vulnerable condition. '9
15. See, e.g., Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Refugees: The Functions and Limits of the Existing Protection
System, in HuMAN RiGmS AND THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 149, 165-73
(Alan E. Nash ed., 1987); Gil Loescher, The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?, 47 J.
INT'L AFF. 351, 376-77 (1994).
16. See, e.g., MYRON WEINER, THE GLOBAL MIGRATION CRISIS: CHA.tENGE TO STATES AND TO
HuMAN RIGHTS (1995) (presenting recent and comprehensive analysis of these developments).
17. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1.
18. On international refugee law, see generally Guy S. GoODWiN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw (1983); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUs OF REFUrEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1972). On domestic asylum law, see generally 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IIalGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 137 (1996).
19. Some conventions have adopted broader refugee definitions. Conclusion 3 of the Cartegena
Declaration classifies as refugees persons "[who] have fled from their country because their life, safety, or
liberty have been threatened by widespread violence, foreign aggression, domestic conflict, massive
violation of human rights or other situations that have seriously disturbed public order." Cartegena
Declaration, quoted in Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1984-85,
Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.L/II.66/Doc.10, rev.1, at 179-82 (1985). The Organization
of African Unity added the following language to the definition of refugee:
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, art. I,
para. 2, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 47; see also supra note 9 (discussing amendment of U.S. refugee definition to
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The refugee protection system, however, has less to do with the legal
niceties of the Refugee Convention than with the political prerogatives of
sovereign states. Each state judges for itself whether a particular migrant or
group of migrants who reaches its territory or seeks resettlement there will
receive that, or any, relief. Each state, moreover, possesses powerful
disincentives to provide relief, especially on its own territory. Such relief is
costly to provide; at a minimum, it includes food, clothing, shelter, and
information. If the state does not allow the migrants to come and go as they
please, it must keep them in custody or under close surveillance. If they remain
in custody in close quarters and enforced idleness, the risks of violence, crime,
and other social pathologies are correspondingly great. Although refugees are
often kept in the most squalid conditions, those conditions may nevertheless be
superior to those in which most citizens of the receiving state live.
In any event, the admission and maintenance of even small numbers of
refugees over long periods of time are almost certain to occasion bitter political
opposition within the receiving state, especially if the refugees are permitted to
compete for scarce jobs. The presence of refugee populations can create serious
foreign policy embarrassments. In sufficient numbers and under certain
conditions, the mere presence of refugees can constitute a genuine national
security threat to the receiving state. They may prompt domestic rioting, ethnic
violence, and the destabilization, perhaps even overthrow, of the regime."0 In
this sense, refugee protection is not simply a human rights issue; it can also be
a matter of geopolitical significance affecting the security of the international
order.
Nor are these risks equally distributed across the globe. To the contrary,
this distribution is decidedly lumpy. Until the demise of the former Soviet
Union and the outbreak of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, Europe had
generated and received relatively few refugees for decades. Even today, most
refugee flows occur in Africa and southern Asia, and the brunt of refugee
burdens by far is borne by neighboring states in those regions.
A state inclined to comply with only the letter of the Refugee Convention
is not obliged to afford much protection to the migrant. The duty of non-
refoulement-the obligation not to return a refugee to conditions of
persecution-is clear enough, but most of the other rights-defining provisions
include those fleeing coercive population control).
20. The armed attacks by exiled Rwandan Hum militias against Tutsis in Zaire is a recent example,
see, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Rwandans, Once Death's Agents, Now Its Victims, N.Y. TIMWES, Apr. 13,
1997, at Al (noting continued refugee crises and persistent ethmic battles among exiles), as is the suspected
killings of refugees by Zairian rebels, see Raymond Bonner, New Refugee Crisis Builds in Zaire, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 1997, at As (reporting that Kabila's rebels may have participated in killings).
Unfortunately, there are many others. See, e.g., Cuban Refugees Riot in Cayman Islands Camp, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, at A7; Edward A. Gargan, 200 Vietnamese Refugees Flee Detention Camps in Hong
Kong, N.Y. TImEs, May 11, 1996, at A4 (reporting on riots, arson, hostage-taking, escapes); Douglas Jehl,
Israeli Barrage Hits U.N. Camp in Lebanon, Killing at Least 75, N.Y. TiMs, Apr. 19, 1996, at Al; Eric
Schmidt, Cuban Refugees Riot in Panama, N.Y. Thts, Dec. 9, 1994, at Al; Philip Shenon, Khmer Rouge
Said To Harass Refugees, N.Y. TnMS, Mar: 26, 1992, at A3 (discussing Khmer Rouge attacks on refugee
camps in Thailand and Cambodia).
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of the Convention contain qualifying phrases and other limitations designed to
protect the interests and prerogatives of the receiving state.21
It appears, however, that most states are not so inclined. For them, free-
riding appears to be the rational strategy in the area of refugee protection. This
means accepting as few refugees as possible in the hope that others will assume
the burdens of resettling or otherwise dealing with them. The pursuit of a free-
rider strategy is constrained only by whatever pressures can be exerted by
domestic refugee advocates, international human rights organizations, and other
states that can deploy a variety of carrots or sticks.
The primary institutional advocates for refugees within the system, and the
most insistent voices calling for state compliance with its norms, are the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the many secular and
religious nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the refugee field.
Yet both UNHCR and the NGOs are chronically underfunded relative to their
growing protection responsibilities, and they are vulnerable to political attack
by the receiving states on whom they must rely for their operating authority,
budget, cooperation, and legitimacy. In reality, these forces compromise them
at every turn. Under the exceedingly difficult circumstances in which UNHCR
and the NGOs must usually work, the wonder is that they perform as effectively
as they do.
For these and other reasons, refugee protection has proven to be woefully
inadequate-a conclusion to which countless human victims bear grim and silent
witness. This inadequacy is especially apparent during refugee emergencies
such as those in southeastern Asia during the 1970s and 1980s, and Africa and
the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Here, however, I wish to emphasize one
systemic, institutional failure that I believe contributes substantially to all of the
others: the failure of refugee burden-sharing among states. If meaningful reform
of the refugee protection system is to occur, it must start here.
The problem is simpler to state than to solve. Although the entire
international community ought to shoulder the burdens of dealing with massive
refugee flows, only a relatively small number of nations and regions actually
do so. Some of those least capable of bearing these burdens have in fact carried
a disproportionately large share of them. This is most strikingly true of some
African states that often serve as countries of first asylum for many of the most
wretched refugees. Conversely, some of the states that are most capable of
incurring refugee burdens have stood on the sidelines watching.
No strong norm of refugee burden-sharing currently exists in international
law or practice. This is not to say that the appeal of such a norm has gone
21. For instance, refugee seamen are accoided the right to "sympathetic consideration to their
establishment on [a contracting state's] territory." 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 11. With
respect to movable and immovable property, see id. art. 13, and with respect to rights of self-employment,
see id. art. 18, refugees are to receive "treatment as favourable as possible," id. arts. 13, 18. Refugees are
accorded the right to freedom of movement "subject to any regulations applicable to alien generally in the
same circumstances." Id. art. 26. Refugees "lawfully in [a state's] territory" may not be expelled."save on
grounds of national security or public order." Id. art. 32.
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unremarked. In recent years, a number of commentators have called for the
creation or recognition by the international community of a norm of equitable
burden-sharing. 2 Some have inferred a principle of international solidarity from
more abstract principles of justice or have discerned such a principle from
existing international instruments' from which the norm of equitable burden-
sharing of refugees might be derived as a logical and normatively desirable
corollary.' Such inferences, however, are more in the nature of moral
exhortation and prudential argument than expositions of authoritative legal
principles.' In practice, there have been very few instances of large-scale
burden-sharing arrangements designed to expand rather than restrict refugee
protectionY The most important example is the CPA.27
1H. THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION
The CPA resettlement program provides a useful study of the conditions
under which burden-sharing can succeed. They developed and were refined
over an extended period of time, and involved intensive bilateral and
multilateral negotiations conducted in a crisis atmosphere in which national self-
interest was the main driving force and jerry-built, practical solutions were the
22. See, e.g., G.J.L. COLES, PROBLEMS AmSINGm FROM LARGE NUMBERS OF AsYLUM-SEEKERS: A
STUDY OF PROTECTION ASPECTS 36-40 (1986); GERASSiMOS FoURLANos, SOVEIEIGNTY AND THE INGRESS
OF ALIENS 155, 159-61 (1986); Howard Adelman, Obligation and Refugees, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15, at 73, 73-87; James C. Hathaway
& R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposalfor Collectivized and
Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. (forthcoming 1997).
23. There are a number of such instruments. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 49 (declaring that
members "shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the
Security Council"); 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 150 (considering "that the grant of asylum
may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which
the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without
international cooperation"); 3 THE COLLECrED TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE 1951 GENEVA CONVENION
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 114 (Alex Takkenberg & Christopher C. Tahbaz eds., 1990)
(recommending "that Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that they act in
concert in a true spirit of international co-operation in order that these refugees may find asylum and the
possibility of resettlement"); infra Section V.
24. See, e.g., GooDVwIN-GmL, supra note 18, at 101-26, 215-34.
25. Howard Adelman, for example, argues for burden-sharing in the following terms:
[Ulnless states that claim to hold to this principle of justice collectively share the burden of
extending that principle to individuals outside the orbit of any state and lacking protection, the
situation will tend to destabilize, particularly in those states most vulnerable in their
commitment to protecting their own citizens. In sum, self-interest, when combined with its
universalization into an abstract principle, dictates an obligation to refugees.
Adelman, supra note 22, at 84.
26. The Dublin, Schengen, and U.S.-Canada agreements, see supra note 8, are burden-sharing
mechanisms, but they seek to restrict protection, not expand it. The three primary examples of large-scale
burden-sharing-the CPA in southeast Asia, the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in
Africa, and the International Conference on Central American Refugees-are discussed in Hathaway &
Neve, supra note 22.
27. See generally INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON INT'L HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, REFUGEES: THE
DYNAMICs OF DISPLACEMENT (1986). Some smaller, regional resettlement programs based on burden-
sharing principles have also been somewhat successful.
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principal desiderata. 2s
After the sweep of communist victories in southeast Asia in 1975, well
over two million people fled Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for "first asylum"
in neighboring countries.29 Before 1979, these people received relatively little
international assistance, and refugee camps were poorly organized." A
coordinated international response began in July 1979, when the United Nations
convened an international conference in Geneva to seek solutions to the
burgeoning refugee crisis. Conference participants were attentive to the
differing abilities of countries to assist the refugees. In its report on the
conference, UNHCR noted that "[s]ince the countries of first asylum were
developing countries confronted with serious economic and social constraints,
it was essential that countries outside the area assumed the principal
responsibility for resettlement."'
The sixty-five governments attending the Geneva conference agreed to
three principal commitments:32 (1) countries in the region would provide at least
temporary asylum;33 (2) the international community would offer resettlement
places for those who had already fled;' and (3) the countries of origin would
discourage hazardous departures and would cooperate with the United Nations
and other countries to promote direct outflows through an Orderly Departure
Program (ODP).
The 1979 accord reflected the national self-interest of the conference
participants .3  Resettlement countries wanted to preserve the precarious
temporary refuge policies of first-asylum countries, which were not signatories
to the 1951 Refugee Convention or to its 1967 Protocol. The United States in
particular was committed to protecting its wartime allies, 36 and to providing "a
28. For a criticism of the CPA's human rights deficiencies, see James C. Hathaway, Labelling the
"Boat People": The Failure of the Human Rights Mandate of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for
Indochinese Refugees, 15 HuM. RTS. Q. 686 (1993).
29. See, e.g., Draft Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action, June 14, 1989, reprinted in
Indochinese Refugees Conference Held in Geneva, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1989, at 69, 71 [hereinafter CPA];
Fact Sheet: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 601, 602 (1992).
30. See Astri Suhrke, Indochinese Refugees: The Law and Politics of First Asylum, in REFUGEES
AND WORLD PoLrTIcs 136, 145 (Elizabeth G. Ferris ed., 1985). From 1975 until the 1979 conference, only
200,000 Indochinese refugees were processed for international resettlement. See UNHCR: Report of the
Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Agenda Item 83, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/34/627 (1979). By May
1979, countries had committed to resettling only 125,000 worldwide. See Court Robinson, Sins of Omission:
The New Vietnamese Refugee Crisis, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1988 INREviw (1989), at5, 6. At the time
of the 1979 conference, 350,000 Indochinese remained in refugee camps in the region. See U(NHCR: Report
of the Secretary General, supra, at 5.
31. UINHCR: Report of the Secretary General, supra note 30, at 5.
32. See Robinson, supra note 30, at 6.
33. See, e.g., Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 904, 101 Stat. 1331,
1402-03 (1987). First-asylum countries consisted primarily of members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)-including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand-as well as Hong Kong.
34. The principal resettlement countries included the United States, Canada, Australia, and France.
35. Mutual self-interest among Central American countries moving toward peace also accounted for
the success of the 1989 Conference on Central American Refugees. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 22.
36. See, e.g., Bill McCollum, Land Vietnamese in Thailand-An Inadequate Response, WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY: 1985 iN REVIEw (1986), at 19, 20; see also The Refugee Act of 1980 and Its
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noncommunist alternative to the peoples of Indochina." 37 In addition to
providing humanitarian assistance, the U.S. interest was served by a system that
accorded presumptive refugee status to all those fleeing the southeast Asian
communist regimes. 3 The resettlement program also supported the conventional
immigration policy goals of resettlement countries.3 9
First-asylum countries in southeast Asia, burdened by the expense and
political difficulties of providing refuge, hoped to stem the tide of refugees and
spread the costs of assistance. As one observer noted, these countries were
persuaded to provide first asylum by the "assurance that the international
community will effectively take care of the refugees, and the smooth operation
of a resettlement programme aiming at an equitable sharing of the burden
imposed on the southeast Asian countries."' The cooperation of the first-
asylum countries was also bolstered by Vietnam's agreement to reduce the
outflows by resuming its dubious policy of prohibiting illegal departures41 and
by creating an in-country Orderly Departure Program (ODP). Finally, the costs
to first-asylum countries were reduced by agreements to place some first-
asylum camps under UNHCR auspices and to have UNHCR cover the direct
costs of their operation.42
The Geneva conference produced immediate results. In 1979, thirty-eight
countries accepted Indochinese refugees for resettlement.43 Vietnam clamped
down on smuggling operations, causing an immediate decline in refugee
outflows.' Resettlement rates increased, causing the population of boat people
in the region to decline from 205,000 in mid-1979 to 40,000 three years later.45
From 1979 until 1989, over 1.7 million Indochinese refugees were resettled
Implementation, Statement Before the House Judiciary Comm. (Apr. 30, 1980), in 19 I.L.M. 700 (statement
of Ambassador Victor H. Palmieri) [hereinafter Palmieri].
37. Subrke, supra note 30, at 145; cf. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 22 (noting U.S. desire to
punish and isolate Vietnam).
38. See, e.g., Suhrke, supra note 30, at 136-37; see also Court Robinson, Buying Time: Refugee
Repatriation from Thailand, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1992 IN REviEw (1993), at 18.
39. The ODP, for instance, served those with family members in the United States and other
Western countries. See Kenneth J. Conboy, An American Agenda for the Geneva Conference on Indochinese
Refugees, Heritage Foundation Reports, No. 104, June 2, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File.
40. Atle Grahl-Madsen, Protection of Indochinese Refugees, in ROUND TABLE ON HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE TO INDO-CHINA REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 69, 70 (International Inst. of Humanitarian
Law ed., 1980).
41. See Suhrke, supra note 30, at 139.
42. See id. at 145. UNHCR's expenses were covered mainly by donations from Japan and the
United States. See id. The costs of running the camps were significant. For instance, in 1979 Hong Kong
spent $14 million to establish and run camps. See Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong: Refugees and Displaced
Persons-The Hong Kong Experience, in ROUND TABLE OF ASIAN ExPERTs ON CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 96, 97 (International Inst. of
Humanitarian Law ed., 1980).
43. See Ingrid Waller, Social Assistance and Integration Programs in the USA, in ROUND TABLE
ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INDO-CHINA REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 40, at 20,
20. By March 1979, France had accepted over 62,000 refugees, Canada over 47,000, and Australia over
37,000. See id. By the end of that year, 290,000 refugees had been resettled in the United States alone. See
id.
44. See Robinson, supra note 30, at 6; see also Suhrke, supra note 30, at 139.
45. See Robinson, supra note 30, at 7.
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under the framework laid out at the 1979 conference,' and over 150,000 left
through the ODP.47
In addition to the confluence of national self-interests, the Indochinese
resettlement program demonstrates three points about burden-sharing. First,
full-scale international cooperation was implemented under the leadership of the
United States and UNHCR. UNHCR coordinated international discussions,
established refugee camps and holding centers, channeled funds to care for the
refugees, and monitored the implementation of the resettlement programs. The
United States, the largest resettlement country, shouldered a significant share
of the costs.48 The sheer number of cooperating countries reflected, at least in
part, U.S. leadership.49 Had the United States and UNHCR not borne the brunt
of the resettlement and organizational burdens, the international consensus
might have unraveled.
Second, the program's success depended upon the full cooperation of all
countries involved; any shirking of one country's responsibilities could upset
the precarious international balance. Several incidents illustrate this point. In
May 1989, Malaysia instituted a policy of turning back boatloads of Vietnamese
refugees and migrants,50 likely causing some neighboring countries to
experience a drastic increase in boat arrivals. In Indonesia, for instance, 3787
Vietnamese arrived in May alone-the highest figure since the beginning of the
outflow. 5' Another such example occurred in 1986, when Vietnam suspended
46. See id. at 6. More than half of the refugees were resettled in the United States. By 1991, the
United States had resettled 1,127,401 Indochinese refugees-745,576 of whom were Vietnamese. See U.S.
Has More Than 1.1 Million Refugees from Indochina, AGENCE FRANCE PREssE, Dec. 19, 1991, at 2. The
rest of the refugees were divided among other resettlement countries. In addition, 280,000 Vietnamese who
fled to China were permanently resettled there. See East Asia and the Pacific, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY:
1989 IN Rnvinw (1990), at 51, 53.
47. See East Asia and the Pacific, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1988 IN REvIEw (1989), at 49, 55;
Robinson, supra note 30, at 8.
48. From 1979 to 1989, the United States contributed over half a billion dollars to the care and
support of Indochinese refugees. See Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Statement at the International Conference
on Indochinese Refugees (June 18, 1989), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1989, at 69, 70. In addition,
the United States spent several billion dollars in resettlement costs. According to a 1989 State Department
estimate, the United States spends $7000 for each refugee resettled-$2000 for transportation and
resettlement and $5000 for social services. See Robert Pear, U.S. Raises Quota of Soviet Refugees by
Cutting Asians', N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 1989, at Al. Considering that the United States resettled over 1.1
million refugees, its financial contribution to the resettlement effort was significant. Japan also contributed
significant financial resources to the resettlement effort. See 11 Billion Yen Aid To Be Offered to Indochina
Refugees, JAPAN ECON. NEwswmE, July 6, 1985, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File
(reporting Japan's pledge to cover half of cost of UNHCR general relief programs for Indochinese refugees
and to donate additional 11 billion yen to these refugees). Japan, however, did not accept many refugees for
resettlement. From 1979 until 1991, less than 8000 refugees were resettled in Japan. See East Asia and the
Pacific, WoRLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1991 IN REVIEw (1992), at 56, 61.
49. In a 1980 speech, the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs stated:
President Carter's pledge to double our rate of resettlement of Indochinese refugees to 14,000
a month was a critical factor in generating new resettlement pledges by over 20 countries at the
Geneva conference last July. Support from the international community encouraged Southeast
Asian countries to begin once again to grant asylum to all new arrivals.
Palmieri, supra note 36, at 700.
50. See East Asia and the Pacific, WoRLp REFUGEE SURvEY: 1990 IN REvmw (1991), at 60, 64.
51. See id. at 62.
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interviews of ODP applicants for U.S. departures.52 As a result, illegal
departures from Vietnam surged, along with the number of arrivals in first-
asylum countries. The neighboring countries responded by refusing asylum to
the new arrivals. Thailand, for example, began sending back boats and denied
those migrants who were admitted an opportunity to seek resettlement. Similar
reactions occurred in Indonesia and Hong Kong.53 In sum, one country's
defection triggered exclusionary reactions in others;' interlocking interests
contributed not only to the implementation of burden-sharing programs, but also
to their effective maintenance.
Third, effective burden-sharing requires efforts to reduce the burdens on
all countries and spread them over time. As the Indochinese resettlement
program progressed, countries began worrying that it caused a "pull effect" by
encouraging people to flee their countries in search of resettlement in the
West.55 As the number of boat arrivals increased and the average stay in the
refugee camps lengthened in the late 1980s, first-asylum countries began taking
unilateral and sometimes inhumane measures to deter further arrivals and to
reduce camp populations.
In response to these concerns, the resettlement program was refined in
1989 at a second Geneva conference on Indochinese refugees. The conference
participants adopted a new program, the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA),
to address the Vietnamese and Lao refugee problems.56 The CPA, which was
scheduled to expire on June 30, 1996, preserved the basic framework of the
earlier resettlement program, with one modification. Under the CPA, refugee
status was no longer conferred automatically on all those who arrived in first-
asylum countries; instead, arrivals were subject to refugee screening by localimmigration officials. Those screened in were eligible to seek resettlement in
a third country, while those screened out remained in holding centers and faced
52. See Robinson, supra note 30, at 6. Vietnam did so to protest a backlog of 22,000 cases. See id.
53. See id.; see also Phan Quang Tue, Going Back Against the Tide, RECORDER, Dec. 19, 1991,
at 6.
54. This holds true in other refugee contexts as well. As one commentator has aptly noted,
"[ulnilateral deterrence pushes the problem onto a neighbour." Barry N. Stein, The Nature of the Refugee
Problem, in HUMAN RIGHs AND THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
15, at 47, 65. As an example, Stein cites a one-year jump in Norway's asylum caseload from 300 to 8000
applicants after neighboring countries closed their borders. Id. (citing Jeff Crisp, Nonvay: Asylum Policy:
The Humanitarian Dilemma, REFUGEES, Aug. 1987, at 13, 14); see also Dennis Gallagher et al., Temporary
Safe-Haven: The Need for North American-European Responses, in REFUGEES AND INTERNAmTONAL
RELATIONS 333, 335-36 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989) (discussing interconnectedness of
asylum policies and examples). This point also applies to the actions of resettlement countries. For instance,
when the United States was sluggish in fulfilling its ODP resettlement commitments, Vietnam retaliated by
halting the program. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Similarly, when the United States reduced
its ODP ceiling in 1989 to accommodate refugees from the former Soviet Union, Vietnam responded by
suspending discussions on allowing 50,000 former political prisoners and their families to emigrate. See
Robinson, supra note 30, at 10.
55. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 30, at 7-8; Suhrke, supra note 30, at 148. According to
Robinson, the "reasons for flight [were] compelling and varied, but it is fair to say that virtually all have
left, not in search of asylum, but in search of resettlement." Robinson, supra note 30, at 8 (citing study by
Ford Foundation).
56. The CPA dealt only with Vietnamese and Lao refugees. Negotiations regarding Cambodian
refugees (who were included in earlier resettlement programs) were conducted separately.
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eventual repatriation.17 To balance concerns over national sovereignty and
human rights, conference participants agreed to establish a "region-wide
refugee status-determination process... in accordance with national legislation
and internationally accepted practice," including UNHCR training and
oversight.58 To secure the support of first-asylum countries, resettlement
countries committed to expedited resettlement of all refugees who arrived prior
to the cut-off date set by the CPA.59 The CPA also called for additional
countries to join the resettlement effort.6
At the time of the sixth follow-up meeting of the Steering Committee of the
International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in March 1995, there
remained 36,339 screened-out Vietnamese and 2048 with refugee status in first-
asylum countries.6 ' Although the Steering Committee called for the completion
of all repatriation and resettlement by the end of 1995, the process was delayed
both because a number of screened-out Vietnamese refused to be repatriated at
all costs, and because the United States proposed to offer screened-out boat
people a second chance to apply for refugee status according to U.S., not CPA,
refugee criteria.62 Word of the U.S. proposal caused "violent anti-repatriation
protests" in the camps and impeded the repatriation and resettlement under the
CPA.6 In early 1996, the Vietnamese government and the United States agreed
to procedures whereby "[p]otential returnees would register for a U.S.
interview before departing the camps. Upon return to Vietnam, they would go
back to their areas of origin to await their interview. Those accepted would be
processed for U.S. resettlement."' UNHCR announced that the CPA would
formally end on June 30, 1996.
IV. FouR REMEDiAL STRATEGIES
Broadly speaking, the problem of massive refugee flows can be addressed
in only four ways.65 I shall call these the root cause, repatriation, temporary
57. See CPA, supra note 29, para. E(9)(b). See generally Robinson, supra note 38; Hiram A. Ruiz,
The CPA: Tempestuous Year Left Boat People Adnift, WORLD REFUGEE Sunvmy: 1995 IN REvirw (1996),
at 82.
58. CPA, supra note 29, para. D(6).
59. See id. para. E(9) (containing multi-year commitment to resettle all Vietnamese who arrived in
temporary asylum camps prior to agreed date). The United States, for instance, agreed to resettle 22,000
of the 52,000 long-stayers. See Eagleburger, supra note 48, at 70. Australia committed to resettling 11,000
long-stayers. See East Asia and the Pacific, supra note 46, at 51.
60. CPA, supra note 29, para. E(9)(a). Specifically, the CPA named the following countries as
resettlement candidates: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
61. See Ruiz, supra note 57, at 82. From the beginning of the CPA in 1989 until the 1995 meeting,
approximately 80,000 Vietnamese were resettled in the West, and over 72,000 others were repatriated to
Vietnam. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 82-83.
64. Id. at 83.
65. I exclude the strategy of altering the legal definition of "refugee." Because narrowing the
definition would deny protection to some individuals who deserve and desperately need it, virtually all
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protection, and permanent resettlement strategies. Each has its own distinctive
advantages and disadvantages. In Part V of this Article, I describe, and in Part
VI defend, a novel version of the temporary protection and permanent
resettlement strategies, which I call proportional burden-sharing.
It is essential to emphasize at the outset (and I shall repeat this point later
on) that although I focus on temporary protection and resettlement through
proportional burden-sharing, I wish to emphasize that they are the least
attractive of the four strategies in principle, and sometimes even in practice. In
short, they are-particularly resettlement-strategies of last resort, but all too
often they are the only resorts. The grim reality is that the root cause and
repatriation strategies are often either unavailable or implemented in ways that
fail to protect refugees as well as even an imperfect system of proportional
burden-sharing might.
One may argue that this need for large-scale temporary protection and
resettlement was historically contingent, a function of the political and military
patterns associated with the Cold War. According to this view, the end of the
Cold War meant the cessation of long, remorseless wars of national liberation
fueled by Soviet-sponsored regimes implacably hostile to returning refugees.
With the spread of democratic governance (so the argument runs), the refugee
flows of today and tomorrow are more environmentally than politically or
ideologically driven; hence refugees can readily return once the environmental
crisis is over. c6
This cheerier scenario may come to pass, but there is as yet little evidence
to support this optimism and, in fact, some that tends to contradict it. The most
recent empirical study suggests that although the sources of refugee flows are
indeed changing, the violence and the distribution of weaponry per conflict are
increasing, making refugee repatriation more difficult.67 As for the future, there
are ominous signs of possible refugee flows from Hong Kong now that it is
under the control of the People's Republic of China.
Nevertheless, my argument in favor of a burden-sharing system does not
rest on any strong claim about the particular level of protection that future
crises may require. To support my argument, it is enough that significant
protection is likely to become a compelling need sometime within the political
time horizon of the major receiving states; that the uncertainties about the
proposals for change urge that the definition be broadened. See, e.g., Frederick B. Baer, International
Refugees as Political Weapons, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 243 (1996); Isabelle R. Gunning, Expanding the
International Definition of Refugee: A Multicultural View, 13 FoRIHAM INT'L L.J. 35, 72-85 (1990).
Whatever the merits of broadening the refugee definition, however, such a reform would simply multiply
the problems discussed in the text. See supra note 19 (discussing broader refugee definitions).
66. For example, Professor Peter J. Spiro, writes:
Of course there are still some pretty nasty regimes scattered here and there, but without the
backbone that communism provided, they are likely, at least in most cases, not to last forever,
so that temporary protection should suffice for those fleeing such conditions. I think it's unlikely
that we will witness anything like the Vietnamese refugee crisis anytime soon.
Letter from Peter J. Spiro, Professor, Hofstra University, to the author 1 (July 1, 1996) (on file with
author).
67. See Weiner, supra note 3.
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timing, magnitude, duration, and resolution of the precipitating refugee crises
are seriously problematic for these states (not to mention for the refugees); and
that these states view as unsatisfactory the ad hoc improvisations that have been
used to handle this problem in the past.
My argument for a formal system of proportional burden-sharing, then, is
a decidedly qualified one. It proposes that in situations in which the root causes
of a refugee crisis can be prevented or eliminated, or in which repatriation can
be safely accomplished, those strategies are preferable to proportional burden-
sharing and should be pursued.' Only in situations in which these conditions
cannot be satisfied does a system of proportional burden-sharing, implemented
through either temporary protection or, in the last resort, permanent
resettlement, become salient.
A. The Root Cause Strategy
Eliminating or preventing the political, economic, environmental, and
cultural conditions that prompt refugees to flee their homes and countries in the
first place is the most attractive approach by far. Obviously, this strategy, if
effective, precludes the necessity for flight and hence forestalls the suffering
that attends it.
The difficulty with a root cause strategy, of course, is that it is extremely
difficult to execute.69 One must be able to identify accurately the conditions
ultimately prompting flight and then be able to rectify those conditions. Both
identification and rectification are daunting obstacles.
The easiest case for identifying root causes should be the environmental
disaster. Yet even here, causal patterns are often complex and elusive, as when
environmental conditions interact with underlying economic and social practices
to produce a catastrophe that would not have occurred otherwise.70 As for
persecution-induced flight, even a readily identified malefactor or regime, such
as Castro's Cuba or Hussein's Iraq, may not be the root cause. As in the
environmental case, the brutal regime's hegemony could be epiphenomenal,
with the true causes embedded in underlying political or cultural
traditions-habituation to authoritarianism, for example-that would probably
survive the regime.7
68. Participants in a research consortium based at York University's Centre for Refugee Studies are
elaborating a strategy for refugee law reform based on a commitment to rights-regarding temporary
protection and dignified repatriation. See generally James C. Hathaway, Can International Refugee Law Be
Made Relevant Again?, WORLD REFUGEE SURvEY: 1995 IN REviEw (1996), at 14.
69. See James C. Hathaway, Root Causes as Refugee Protection: A Chimerical Promise?, in
IMMIGRATION AND EUROPEAN UNION: BUILDING ON A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 117, 117-21 (S. Perrakis
ed., 1995).
70. Examples include famines, which are sometimes caused or at least exacerbated by inefficient
agricultural policies and distribution systems, and floods, which sometimes reflect perverse patterns of tidal
land development.
71. Even in relatively democratic societies, such traditions appear to play an important role in
differentiating political and economic outcomes. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK:
Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 183-85 (1993) (noting that social capital is dominant factor).
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An even more serious obstacle to a successful root cause strategy,
however, is the problem of rectification. Even those root causes that can be
accurately identified are often impossible to change-at least in the short run
and with the limited policy instruments available even to states willing (within
limits) to act to prevent human rights abuses. The fecklessness of the United
Nations in dealing with refugee-producing atrocities committed by local
satrapies in the former Yugoslavia is a particularly telling and grim example.
In part, this impotence reflects the constraints on intervention posed by the
strong norm of national sovereignty in international law and politics.72 Despite
several recent instances in which this norm has been overridden in the name of
human rights,73 that norm continues to be a formidable limitation on our ability
to mount and deploy a root cause strategy in other states. Even if the norm
against intervention did not exist, the underlying social realities are notoriously
hard to reform-even in one's own country, not to mention in other societies
whose workings we understand far less. In such circumstances, the law of
unintended consequences operates with a particularly remorseless logic.
Not surprisingly, the most common and uncontroversial means through
which states seek to prevent the flow of refugees and other migrants from
source countries are the consensual policies of trade, investment, development
assistance, and other forms of foreign aid. Along with border controls, such
policies-culminating in NAFrA-have been the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to
reduce the flow of undocumented workers and their families from Mexico.74 But
while these policies may be mutually beneficial and highly desirable on their
own terms, their potential for strengthening the source country's economy,
polity, and society in ways that will reduce refugee and immigrant flows-at
least in the short run-is relatively limited.75
72. It is not simply physical invasions of a state's territory that the norm of state sovereignty
constrains. The norm also prevents a state that has borne the costs of another state's refugee-generating
policies or practices from suing the source state to recover those costs. Establishing such a cause of action
could-assuming that the source state's causal responsibility could be proved and the resulting judgment
could be enforced-render a root cause strategy far more effective. The freezing of Iraq's assets abroad and
the embargo on its crude-oil sales after the Persian Gulf War were modest steps in that direction. By way
of analogy, consider other intergovernmental transfer obligations: the U.S. government's obligation under
the 1995 unfunded mandate legislation to reimburse state and local governments for their costs of complying
with certain federally-imposed requirements, see Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
4, 109 Stat. 48, and the Elizabethan poor laws' provision for communities receiving destitute residents of
other communities to charge the latter for certain maintenance costs, even to the point of litigatio, see, e.g.,
MIcHABLKATz, THE UNDESERVING POOR 11-12 (1989). But see International Law Ass'n, Draft Declaration
of Principles of International Law on Compensation to Refugees and Countries of Asylum (Report of the 64th
Conf., 1991), reprinted in 64 INT'L L. PRoc. 333 (1991).
73. These instances include the creation after the Persian Gulf War of a "safe zone" in northern Iraq
to protect the Kurdish minority there, and the U.S. invasion of Haiti to restore President Aristide. Another
example is the ill-fated ECOMOG involvement in Liberia. See, e.g., Hugh Dellios, No More Rwandas?
U.S. Proposal for All-African Peacekeeping Force Draws Fire, CHn. TRm., Oct. 8, 1996, at 3 (noting
corruption and partisanship of ECOMOG troops).
74. See, e.g., James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 793, 800-01 n.22, 841 n.202 (1994).
75. See Christopher Mitchell, The Impact of U.S. Policy on Migration from Mexico and the
Caribbean, in MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND FOREIGN PoLIcy: U.S. AND GERMAN PoLCEs TOWARD
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, supra note 3.
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Indeed, economic development in the source country may actually have the
opposite effect. By increasing the education and mobility levels of potential
migrants, improving their information about conditions and opportunities in
destination countries, and raising their expectations, economic development can
encourage those with the greatest energy, courage, and determination to try
their luck elsewhere. Development also tends to create a middle class that
demands political liberalization from undemocratic regimes, which may respond
with the kinds of repressive measures that often generate refugee flows. 6
Again, the capacity of economic and political development to ameliorate human
rights abuses and stem refugee and immigrant flows cannot seriously be
questioned. However, the course and pace of such development and its effects
on migration patterns are poorly understood and notoriously unpredictable.
Root cause strategies that are premised on the easy cultivation and rapid success
of development are likely to be disappointing.
B. The Repatriation Strategy
If, as is usually the case, the root causes of refugee flows cannot be
prevented or eliminated, it follows that refugees will flee. In that event, the
paramount goal of a human-rights strategy must be to restore the normalcy of
refugees' lives by returning them to their homes and families as soon as
possible. This approach is more practicable than the root cause strategy and is
likely to be far less expensive, as it does not require (indeed, it hopes to
prevent) refugees from establishing new roots in the country of refuge.
In fact, many refugees are eventually repatriated,7 some within a relatively
short period of time after their initial flight. For the others, however,
"eventually" can be a very long time indeed.' In principle, repatriation should
not occur until conditions in the source country have stabilized enough for the
refugees to return safely. If the regime that persecuted them remains in power,
such a return may be dangerous. Their homes and businesses may have been
seized, occupied, or formally expropriated by the regime or private marauders,
leaving them little to which they can return. They also may have reason to fear
death or other reprisals at home should they return. For these reasons,
voluntary repatriation may not be possible for years, even for those refugees
who ardently wish to return to their homelands, while forcible repatriation may
76. See NAFTA, Non-Trade Related Issues: Immigration, MEx. TRADE & L. REP., Nov. 1993, at
9, 11 (noting that economic development may, in short term, increase migration).
77. For some statistics on voluntary and involuntary repatriations, see World Refugee Statistics,
supra note 2, at 7 tbls.5, 6.
78. See, e.g., John Kifner, Conflict in the Balkans: A Holocaust Rescuer Is Herself Rescued from
Siege of Sarajevo, N.Y. TIDm, Feb. 8, 1994, at A15 ("Many [members of Sarajevo's Jewish community]
arrived here carrying the keys to their homes in Spain in the belief that they would soon return there, and
many of the keys have been handed down through many generations."); Sebastiao Salgado, War Without
End, N.Y. TIm MAG., July 30, 1995, at 24 (reporting that 40,000 Vietnamese boat people remain in
detention camps after 20 years). For the Palestinian refugees who lived in and wish to return to what is now
Israel, repatriation is not in sight after almost half a century. This is admittedly an unusual case.
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be resisted even to the point of violence or suicide.79
The "end-game" of the CPA, which was scheduled to expire on June 30,
1996, presented a variation on the same theme. With more than one million
Indochinese refugees resettled since 1975, mostly in the United States,
approximately 33,000 boat people, whose claims to refugee status had been
repeatedly rejected, remained in southeast Asian camps. Under the CPA, these
people were to be repatriated-by force, if necessary. In the United States,
Senator Jesse Helms, Congressman Christopher Smith, and other elected
officials opposed repatriation, insisting that these refugees would face
persecution if returned to Vietnam and that they should instead be permitted to
resettle in the United States. This, in turn, emboldened the remaining boat
people to resist repatriation to the point of violent rioting, destroying camp
buildings, taking hostages, and in many cases escaping. The United States,
unwilling to face the prospect of effectuating a forcible repatriation that might
require it to spill the blood of innocents who had already suffered for years in
the camps, reached an eleventh-hour agreement with Vietnam for a repatriation
that for many of the returnees may only be brief. Under the agreement, they
will be returned to Vietnam where they will be permitted to file yet another
claim for refugee status and apply once again for resettlement in the United
States. It was expected that thousands of these claims would succeed. 0 In this
way, the United States has adopted a new sub-strategy-what might be called
"temporary repatriation."
C. The Temporary Protection Strategy
If conditions in the source country make immediate repatriation (whether
temporary or permanent) impossible, one must adopt an interim approach until
the refugees can be safely returned. This, of course, is the purpose of granting
political asylum; it is a temporary protected status that may, but need not, lead
to a right of permanent residence. Indeed, if the conditions in the source
country change so that the threat of persecution no longer exists, asylum may
be properly rescinded."'
But although traditional refugee law is preoccupied with questions of
asylum eligibility, determination, and rights, the number of individuals granted
asylum is but a tiny fraction of those who actually receive protection and an
79. See, e.g., Gargan, supra note 20 (reporting that refugees in Hong Kong rioted when faced with
repatriation to Vietnam); James C. McKinley, Jr., Some Rwandan Exiles Can't Go Home Again, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1996, at As (reporting that because of fear of reprisals, Hutu refugees refuse to return
despite harsh conditions in camps and campaign by UNHCR to convince them of safe conditions at home);
Seth Mydans, In Thai Camps, Fear of Burmese Troops Grows, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1997, at A3 (describing
new policy of Thai government that only women, children, and elderly among Burmese refugees will be
allowed to stay in Thailand).
80. See Steven Erlanger, U.S. and Hanoi Agree To Give Boat People One Last Chance, N.Y.
Thm, May 15, 1996, at A13; see also Gargan, supra note 20.
81. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1994). This cessation provision follows article 1(C)(5) of the 1951
Refugee Convention, surpa note 1.
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even smaller fraction of those who genuinely need protection. Most countries
of first asylum have concluded that the fiscal and political costs of adjudicating
mass asylum claims, granting employment and residence rights while those
claims are pending, and permanently integrating asylees into their societies are
simply unacceptable.' As a result, asylum law has become less and less
relevant to the protection problem in mass influx situations. 3 Other solutions
are desperately needed.
Instead of granting asylum, the more common response of states faced with
large refugee influxes-even those with highly developed asylum determination
systems and absorptive capacity-has been to provide some form of temporary
protection in the protecting state.' Properly and humanely deployed,' it can be
a flexible, practicable regime of protection in mass influx situations so long as
states observe certain safeguards-especially decent living standards, access to
a fair asylum determination process, and genuine non-refoulement.
If these conditions are met, there should be no objection to a protecting
state "renting space" outside of its territory to provide temporary safe haven. 6
Indeed, temporary protection has the great virtue that it can usually be
effectuated in or near the first-asylum state, which tends to be near the
refugee's country of origin. It therefore minimizes the psychological and
economic costs of moving the refugee again, safely maintaining her in her
present location and close to her past and hopefully future home. Moreover,
because grants of asylum or permanent resettlement are relatively rare, and safe
repatriation may be impossible, the refugee's options are likely to be temporary
protection or nothing.
82. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 16(a)(4) (F.R.G.) ("The implementation of
measures terminating a person's sojourn shall ... be suspended by the court only where serious doubt exists
as to the legality of the measure .... ").
83. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary "Refuge" and Local
Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 13, 16 (1994).
84. It is sometimes called temporary refuge, temporary asylum, or temporary safe haven. Those
who receive it are sometimes called de facto refugees.This is to be distinguished from the creation of "safe
areas" for refugees in the state of origin, as the United States and its allies did in Iraq after the Persian Gulf
War. For a discussion of other variants of safe haven, see Weiner, supra note 3 (distinguishing among
models in which powerful third country controls safe territory elsewhere (Guantanamo), self-administered
safe zones within country of origin (Kurds in Iraq), and intermtionally protected safe zones within country
of origin (Bosnia)). As Fitzpatrick notes, temporary refuge "has become more regularized and formalized,
assuming an unaccustomed prominence in the refugee policies of European states." Fitzpatrick, supra note
83, at 16; see also Joanne Thorburn, Transcending Boundaries: Temporary Protection and Burden-Sharing
in Europe, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 459 (1995).
85. Joan Fitzpatrick and others criticize temporary protection as simply one more transparent device
(like detention, denial of work permits, and other such policies) to constrict migrants' access to the rights
and remedies established for Convention refugees. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 83, at 16-18; Harold
HongJu Koh, America's Offishore Refugee Camps, 29 U. RicH. L. Ry. 139 (1994) (chronicling, describing,
and criticizing U.S. temporary protection policies toward Haitians and Cubans); see also Gerald L. Neuman,
Recent Trends in United States Migration Control, 38 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 284, 288-98 (1995)
(discussing Koh article).
86. Just as the United States procured such space in the Caribbean, so European and Asian states
could do so in their regions. Section 604 of EIRIRA excepts from the statutory right to apply for asylum
those aliens who can be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement, to a third country that
is "safe" (as defined by the provision). See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 604, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158).
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Temporary protection is also a desirable strategy from the perspective of
industrialized states' narrow self-interest. It is a way to keep refugees safely (in
both senses) in the Third World from which most of them come, thereby
alleviating the pressures to grant them permanent resettlement in the First
World. Any refugee protection scheme that does not promise to accomplish
these goals is unlikely to attract the necessary political support by industrialized
states. It is for this reason that a meaningful system of refugee protection must
rest on the foundation of a viable temporary refuge option.
Even so, temporary protection can impose serious costs on industrialized
states. If temporary protection is to succeed in deterring migration to their
territories, these states must ensure that the migrants are protected under
conditions of detention, isolation, and privation with little hope of gaining legal
status, while also providing levels of safety and hygiene demanded by their
domestic standards of decency, if not by the vague common-denominator norms
of international refugee law. This is an exceedingly difficult balance to strike,
and even such minimal levels of amenity can be very costly for the government
to maintain, especially over a long period of time.,,
Time, then, is of the essence. The protecting state may find that
"temporary" safe haven is something of an illusion, if not an oxymoron-that
what was justified as short-term relief has a way of becoming, in effect,
permanent resettlement.ss This development is of the utmost importance for the
future of refugee protection. If potential protecting states come to believe that
refuge granted on a nominally "temporary" basis is likely to become
permanent, they will be more reluctant to offer it.
87. The United States, for example, spent $1 million per day to maintain its refugee camps on the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. See U.S. Policy Toward Cuba: Hearings Before the W. Hemisphere Subcormm
of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. (1995) (statement of Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs), reprinted in 6 U.S. DnP'T ST. DISPATCH 446, 451 (1995); Gillian Gunn, Over Troubled Waters:
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba Has Changed, but Does the President Know It?, WASH. PoST, May 21, 1995,
at C2. In 1979, Hong Kong spent $14 million to establish and run camps. See Mushkat, supra note 42, at
97. In the view of some knowledgeable observers, even these expenditures have not produced adequate
conditions. Professor Koh, who represented the migrants on Guantanamo against the U.S. government, calls
for
shelters capable of withstanding the elements; refugees housed in family groups and allowed
freedom of movement within the camps; private voluntary agencies, nongovernmental
organizations, and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, not the United States
military, running the camp's religious, education [sic], and recreational services; the United
States Public Health Service and not the military providing health care; with mail and phone
access made available to the refugees, along with ready access of press, human rights monitors,
volunteer religious organizations, and doctors. Social activities at the camps-education,
religion, books, recreation, intracamp communication and the like-must be greatly expanded
to maintain morale and reduce tensions and frustration.... The access of lawyers and legal
counseling is as important to the success of these camps as medical counseling.
Koh, supra note 85, at 171-72.
88. virtually all proponents of temporary protection say far more about protection than about its
temporary aspect. See, e.g., Thorburn, supra note 84. Yet it is clear that states will not provide this remedy
unless they believe that the burden will indeed be short-lived. Professor James C. Hathaway is a rare
academic voice who acknowledges and seeks to deal with this reality. See Manuel A. Castillo & James C.
Hathaway, Temporary Protection, in RECONCErIwNG INTERNAnTINAL REFUGEE LAw (James C. Hathaway
ed., forthcoming 1997).
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This is increasingly the case in the United States, where temporary
protection either on or near American soil has recently been ratcheted upward
into more or less permanent residence. The most important example of this
concerns the Salvadorans who entered the United States illegally during the
1980s and who, after having successfully avoided deportation, were granted
temporary protected status (TPS)89 under the special provisions of the
Immigration Act of 1990. The Act authorized such relief on the understanding
that the Salvadorans would return to El Salvador once conditions there
stabilized. 90 During the early 1990s, the administration and Congress extended
the departure dates several times and when the program finally expired in
December 1994, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) granted nine
more months for the Salvadorans to file for asylum or seek legal status. This
concession reflected the fact that the INS had massively violated Salvadorans'
legal rights in processing and rejecting their asylum claims during the 1980s.
Approximately 150,000 of them reapplied.
Most experts predict that few of the almost 200,000 original TPS
Salvadorans will ever have to leave. The remaining TPS Salvadorans can now
have their claims reheard, although changed circumstances have made most of
these claims harder to sustain than they would have been during the 1980s. This
process will drag on for years due to a current and growing backlog of over
400,000 asylum cases. 9' The INS does not know what happened to the original
187,000 TPS Salvadorans, or how many remain (the estimate is 100,000), much
less their names or locations. Most probably melted into the population,
managed to secure legal status, or returned to El Salvador on their own. As
many skeptics had predicted, TPS turned out in the Salvadoran case to be "a
slow way of saying yes. "92 It remains to be seen whether the six other
countries' nationals who now enjoy TPS will similarly be able to bootstrap their
presence in the United States into permanent residence. In any event, the
Salvadoran experience makes it doubtful that the U.S. government will grant
temporary protection as readily in the future.
Even when the United States moved its temporary protection program
offshore by placing Cuban migrants on Guantanamo and in Panama, most of
them ended up receiving permanent residence, despite the frequent insistence
by the President and Attorney General that these Cubans would never be
permitted to enter the United States.' These Cubans managed to convert
89. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254a note (West Supp. 1997) (Special Temporary Protected Status for
Salvadorans, originally enacted as Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 303, amended by Pub.
L. No. 102-65, 105 Stat. 322 (1991); Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 308(g)(1), (g)(6)(A), 110 Stat
3009 (1996)).
90. For a summary history of Salvadoran TPS, see THOMAS ALExANDER ALEiNiKOFF ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION PRocEss AND PouicY 889-96 (3d ed. 1995); id. at 100 (Supp. 1997).
91. Some 149,500 new applications were filed in fiscal year 1995, up slightly from 146,400 in fiscal
year 1994. See Congress: Immigration, Welfare, Minimum Wages, MIGRATION NEws, Aug. 1996, at 8,
<http://migration.udavis.eduBy-MonthiMN-Vol-3-961MN_Aug_96.hmtl#RTF.C3 >.
92. KATHLEEN NEwLAND, U.S. REFUGEE POLIcy: DEmAS AND DnmEcrioNs 27 (1995).
93. The same was not true of the Haitian refugees at Guantanamo. See generally Terry Coonan,
America Adrift: Refoulement on the High Seas, 93 U. CN. L. REv. 1241 (1995).
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temporary protection into permanent status not because the United States
deemed them refugees-quite the contrary-but because the U.S. government,
for a combination of political and fiscal reasons, was not prepared to return
them to Cuba or to continue their temporary protection status in the
Guantanamo and Panama camps.'
Several other forms of temporary protection have been attempted. In some
cases, military action or U.N. fiat has established putatively safe enclaves in the
countries of origin, as in northern Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. The
conditions necessary to create and maintain such enclaves, however, are quite
limited. In other cases, the destination state has negotiated bilateral or
multilateral "readmission agreements" with third countries (usually countries
of transit) to admit (or readmit) certain categories of migrants and to provide
them with certain services and protections until they can be repatriated or their
status otherwise regularized. Germany has concluded these agreements with
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania.95 The principal purpose of such
agreements, of course, is not humanitarian but more effective border control by
enlisting the cooperation of neighboring states through which the migrants
pass.' From the perspective of the destination state, however, this assistance
by the transit states may be costly to procure. Such arrangements, moreover,
also risk human rights violations by the transit states, whose citizens are likely
to be hostile to the migrants' presence. This hostility can be expected to
increase as time goes on.
Temporary refuge is the keystone of the refugee protection structure. If
past is prologue, states will always confine their grants of asylum and
permanent resettlement to a relatively small number of refugees; for most
refugees, the best that they can hope for is temporary protection. Unless the
system can credibly assure states that the temporary protection they grant will
indeed be temporary, its availability to refugees is likely to be undermined, with
tragic effects. Thus an important test of the value of any reform is whether it
can maintain that credibility. I hope to demonstrate in Part V that proportional
burden-sharing, through marketable quotas, would create the incentives to
satisfy that test.
D. Permanent Resettlement
As I noted earlier, resettlement must be the protective strategy of last
resort, employed only when the root causes of flight cannot be prevented or
eliminated, and safe repatriation to the country of origin or to another site of
temporary protection within a reasonable period of time cannot be effected.
Resettlement in a third country is costly to the refugee, who must be uprooted
94. See Neuman, supra note 85, at 293-97.
95. See Olaf F. Reerman, Readmission Agreements, in IMMIGRATION ADMISSIONS: THE SEARCH FOR
WoRKABLE PoucEs IN GERmANY AND THE UNrrED SrATES (K. Hailbronner et al. eds., forthcoming 1997).
96. See Alan Cowell, German Court Upholds Laws To Limit Foreigners Seeking Refitge, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1996, at A5 (noting that Constitutional Court upheld third-country transit rules).
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once again and then reestablished in a society that is likely to be alien in
culture, language, and other respects. It is also costly to the receiving country,
which must either assist the refugee to assimilate successfully or run the social
risks of her failure to do so. These costs are likely to be much higher than
temporary protection, which can lead to repatriation in the not too distant
future.
As we have just seen, however, repatriation in the short term is impossible
in a tragically large number of cases. This is especially true when the migration
flow has been fueled by policies of uncompromising and perhaps permanent
ethnic or religious persecution carried out by the regime in power in the country
of origin. For persecuted minorities who have fled, the alternative to
resettlement is to languish for many years in what anijounts to a prison, isolated
from normal social intercourse and economic activity and without the amenities
of family life. In such cases, resettlement-problematic as it is-may be the
"least bad" remedy.
No one knows for sure how many of the world's refugees need
resettlement. Uncertainty on this question, of course, largely reflects the
ambiguity of "need" in this context, the contested factual and value judgments
that give content to that term, and the political considerations that affect all
estimates in this area.'
Only a few countries, however, now offer permanent resettlement to a
significant number of refugees. The United States accepts by far the largest
number of any country, at least in absolute terms.9 In 1995 it adjusted the
status of 106,827 refugees to that of legal permanent resident. 99 If asylee
adjustments are included, the total rises to more than 114,664 in 1995. '°
Sweden, which accepts more refugees and asylees in proportion to its
population than any other country, did so for about 36,400 people in 1993;
Canada, with a population almost four times Sweden's, gave relief to only half
as many (18,400), while Australia, with twice Sweden's population, accepted
fewer than one-fourth as many (8800). The Netherlands and the United
Kingdom each accepted about 10,000, while Germany accepted 16,000. In both
the United States and Europe, there are signs that political changes may soon
reduce the number of such offers. 101 Nor are other resettlement countries
immune from many of the political pressures that may limit future refugee and
97. See World Refugee Statistics, WORLD REFUGEE SuRvEY: 1994 IN REvE (1995), at 42, 43
tbls.1, 2.
98. As a percentage of refugee and asylum admissions to total population, however, the United
States ranked fifth behind Sweden, Canada, Australia, and Denmark in 1994. See id. at 46 tbl.9.
99. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALZATION SERV., 1995 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 83 tbhl.26 (1997).
100. See id. at 91 tbl.32.
101. In what could be an augury of restrictions to come, Congress's blue-ribbon Commission on
Immigration Reform recommended in June 1995 that the annual refugee quota, which was 112,000 in 1995,
be reduced to 50,000. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SETTING
PRIORITIES 131 (1995). The Commission believed that this change would still accommodate at least twice
as many Convention refugees as under the current quota, which resettles many who are now accepted under
a lower standard but who would not qualify as Convention refugees. See id.
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asylum admissions in the United States.' °0
The vast majority of countries, however, make few or no resettlement
offers even though some of them have ample resources for doing so. Japan,
which enjoys the second largest economy in the world, provides a particularly
striking example of resistance. Japan subscribed to the Refugee Convention in
1981 and enacted implementing legislation the next year. Nevertheless, in the
thirteen years between 1982 and May 1995, Japan granted asylum to only 208
refugees-an average of sixteen per year. It also resettled 8679 Indochinese
refugees.' 3 Finally, Japan extends "special permission to stay" to a small
number (393 in 1991, for example) of deportable Chinese and other Asians, a
group considered "de facto refugees."'" Japan does score higher in terms of
financial and material assistance to international refugee-aid agencies'° 5-a point
to which I shall return.
This extreme concentration of resettlement offers in a few countries means
that when refugee emergencies occur (as they increasingly do), UNHCR and
voluntary refugee organizations move reflexively (like Claude Rains' order in
Casablanca) to "round up the usual suspects." Such a response is perfectly
understandable and rational; after all (as Willie Sutton noted in explaining why
he robbed banks), "that's where the money is." This approach, however, is
becoming more inadequate and futile in a world of seemingly endless refugee
emergencies in which prompt, safe repatriation is often impossible, and
temporary protection is shunned by countries fearing, with some reason, that
it could become permanent and thus attract even more migrants.
V. THE PROPOSAL: PROPORTIONAL BURDEN-SHAING
What, then, is to be done? My proposal seeks a refugee protection system
that can simultaneously achieve four major objectives: (1) maximization of
protection resources; (2) observance of human rights principles; (3) respect for
political constraints; and (4) administrative simplicity. Before explaining the
proposal, I shall briefly discuss each of these goals.
Maximization of Resources Available for Protection. The system should
maximize the total resources available for the genuine protection of refugees.
I view this as the paramount objective; its primacy justifies compromising,
where necessary, other important but less central goals. Protection resources
can be maximized in two ways: by drawing new resources into the system and
by better utilizing whatever resources exist. Thus, as many states as possible
should participate in the protective system, not just those that possess a
102. See infra text accompanying notes 112-18.
103. By way of comparison, Canada, with one-fourth of Japan's population, resettled more than
136,000 Indochinese. The United States, with twice Japan's population, resettled about 820,000, but this
partly reflected, of course, the special role of the United States in the Vietnam War. See IsAMI TAKEDA,
JAPAN'S RESPONSEs TO REFUGEES AND PoLCAutAsyLum-SEm 3, 6 (International Migration Working
Paper Series, 1995).
104. See id. at 9, 11 tbl.2.
105. See World Refugee Statistics, supra note 97, at 45-46 tbls.8, 10.
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particular resource (such as cash, space, or ethnic diversity) or that happen to
abut a refugee-producing area. In addition, the system should create incentives
to use those resources most effectively. Specifically, it should encourage each
state to allocate whatever resources it possesses or can mobilize to the refugee-
protection strategy or strategies-root cause, temporary protection-cum-
repatriation, and resettlement-that can be achieved to the greatest extent at the
least cost.
Observance of Human Rights Principles. The system should ensure that
refugees actually receive the protection to which international human rights law
already entitles them. Failing that-and recognizing that the current system
often falls far short on this score-their treatment should at least be no worse
than it is now.
Respect for Political Constraints. The system should acknowledge the
important political constraints that will inevitably continue to shape any
meaningful international regime of refugee protection, and its institutions and
practices should take due account of those constraints. These constraints are
quite formidable, and I have no wish to minimize them. Some of them might
seem inimical to more expansive refugee protection; they appear to be decidedly
unpromising materials for policy reform. Yet, as I explain below, we can hope
to turn three of these constraining conditions-the abiding forces of state
sovereignty and self-interest, the growing vulnerability of all states to unwanted
refugee influxes, and the diversity of states' traditions and resources for dealing
with refugee flows-to some advantage. Indeed, any reform must come to terms
with these conditions. A market-oriented approach is peculiarly capable of
exploiting them.
Administrative Simplicity. Consistent with its other goals, the system should
adopt a decentralized decisionmaking structure, leaving as much initiative as
possible to individual states. It should seek to minimize the informational
requirements and other transaction costs of the system's decisionmakers.
The proposal consists of five main structural elements: (1) agreement by
states in a region on a strong norm that all ought to bear a share of temporary
protection and permanent resettlement needs proportionate to their burden-
bearing capacity; (2) a process for determining the number of those who need
such protection; (3) a set of criteria for allocating this burden among states in
the form of quotas; (4) a market in which states can purchase and sell quota
compliance obligations; and (5) an international authority to administer the
quota system and regulate this market. I shall discuss each of these elements
and then identify some of the implementation and enforcement issues that would
need to be resolved for the system to work.
In noting these implementation issues, I wish to emphasize what will be
obvious to any well-informed reader: Many additional details must be addressed
before the scheme can be fully realized. I recognize, of course, that the devil
is often in the details. Nevertheless, I think that I am justified in assuming that
should agreement be reached on the main outlines of these five structural
elements, the rest can, through negotiation, be worked out. Accordingly, I do
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not dwell on the details here.
A. The Principle of Burden-Sharing
As noted in Part II, international practice in the area of refugee protection
reveals the existence of what might be called a weak norm of burden-sharing.
A number of international instruments and scholarly analyses proclaim the
importance of such a norm and exhort states to observe it. On the more
mundane level of international practice, refugee-receiving states have entered
into a number of arrangements in recent decades to share the burdens of major
refugee crises, notably the CPA in Indochina1" and the 1989 Conference on
Central American Refugees." °
This burden-sharing norm, however, is manifestly weak. In the
international instruments in which it can be discerned, the burden-sharing
imperative is essentially precatory and hortatory; even its most energetic
scholarly exponents like Goodwin-Gill seem to view it more as a moral
aspiration than as a legally binding duty on all states. No effort has been
mounted to enforce the norm against the numerous states that ignore it. Even
in the war in the former Yugoslavia, which was waged with appalling ferocity
in the very heart of Europe, the burden of protecting refugees was shared only
to a very limited extent, with Croatia, Slovenia, and Germany bearing the brunt
of it. 10
Nevertheless, the moral and prudential foundations for imposing such a
duty seem sturdy enough to establish a more robust burden-sharing regime.
Joanne Thorburn advances three arguments for this norm, based on human
rights, states' self-interest, and the non-refoulement principle:
[Florcibly moving the people, albeit for protection purposes, would be questionable from a
human rights perspective.... The statist argument would find support in upholding the right
to control admission, as people would not be arriving at the borders of one's own (distant)
State because their level of protection would be sufficient in countries close to the State of
origin (thanks to financial assistance and logistical support), and because the development and
integrity of the first country of asylum would also be supported. However, the primary
arguments for burden-sharing lie in support of the principle of non-refoulement ... and in
its necessity as an accompaniment to a firmly established norm of temporary protection....
Refoulement, even by proxy, is to be avoided at all costs. 09
There is another justification for the burden-sharing norm based on the
adventitious character of most refugee crises. Refugee flows usually occur with
106. See supra Part Ill.
107. For a discussion of this burden-sharing arrangement, see Hathaway & Neve, supra note 22; see
also Dennis Gallagher, The Evolution of the International Refugee System, 23 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 579,
590-91 (1989); Rosemarie Rogers, The Future of Refugee Flows and Policies, 26 INT'L MIGRATrIoN REv.
1112, 1133-34 (1992).
108. See Thorburn, supra note 84 (discussing Croatian and Slovenian efforts but unaccountably
failing to mention Germany's granting of temporary refuge to hundreds of thousands of Croatians displaced
by war there).
109. Id. at 476-77.
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a suddenness, violence, and magnitude that can swiftly overwhelm the
resources of a first-asylum state that is only linked to the flow by an accident
of nature-its fortuitous proximity to the source country. In this respect, refugee
emergencies resemble natural disasters like earthquakes and tornadoes,
calamities as to which the norm of international solidarity and burden-sharing
is relatively strong. The relationship of first-asylum states to refugee flows, of
course, does not always possess this random, fortuitous character. In some
cases, the first-asylum state, far from being an innocent bystander, bears some
causal and hence moral responsibility for refugee flows; it may even have
fanned or instigated the unrest that unleashed the crisis. The first-asylum state
may hope to use the refugees' flight to discredit or destabilize the source
country regime (for example, American policy toward Castro's Cuba and
Zaire's policy toward Rwanda), or it may have revanchist designs on the source
country (for example, Indian and Pakistani policies in Kashmir). Like some
societies plagued by certain natural disasters, 1 ' first-asylum states sometimes
bring refugee crises on themselves.
The possibility that some first-asylum states are complicit in refugee flows
should surely be taken into account in designing and administering a reformed
system of refugee protection. Indeed, imposing a binding obligation to bear
some of the burdens that such a state causes might reduce its propensity to
instigate refugee crises in the first place. Even so, the more compelling fact is
that first-asylum states ordinarily are not in any morally meaningful sense
responsible for their plight. Recognition of this is an important building block
in the necessary structure of justification and political support for a norm of
universal burden-sharing.
If the innocent helplessness of most first-asylum states is a morally
constructive support for this norm, another fact-that different states face
somewhat different risks of becoming a first-asylum country-tends to
undermine political support for the norm. This risk differential makes it difficult
to secure agreement on, much less compliance with, the norm because it
reinforces the incentives of relatively insular"' and hence low-risk states to
avoid burden-sharing by free-riding on the self-interested efforts of the higher-
risk states, leaving the latter to bear all of the burdens. This process of
defection by low-risk states undermines the viability of any system, like the
current one, that relies on voluntary burden-sharing and generates very weak
incentives to cooperate. The analogy to the problem of adverse selection in the
insurance context-in which those presenting relatively low risks will not
participate in insurance pools that charge them average-risk premiums-is apt.
No burden-sharing scheme, including the "refugee crisis insurance" approach
proposed here, can be effective unless this problem of differential risks is
squarely addressed.
110. See supra text accompanying note 3.
111. The word "insular" here simply refers to a condition of relative immunity from large migration
flows, whether the barriers to such flows are geographical or geopolitical.
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Generally speaking, there are only two possible solutions to this problem.
The first is to increase the estimates by traditionally insular states of their risk
of becoming a first-asylum country. The second is to strengthen the other non-
risk related incentives of all states, but especially of those at low risk of refugee
flows, to participate in burden-sharing efforts. Both approaches are difficult to
implement. Nevertheless, recent developments have rendered them, especially
the first, somewhat more promising.
The risk that any state will become a first-asylum country is growing. The
economic, spatial, and geopolitical barriers that until recently inhibited mass
refugee flows are falling. Virtually all states realize that their territories are
potential targets of sudden and possibly large refugee movements-with all of
the attendant risks, political and otherwise, that such movements pose to the
regime in power. Today, no state is immune; even island nations like Japan and
Australia are vulnerable to spasmodic in-migration from the mainland.
Ironically, this reality, which is certainly regrettable from the insular states'
perspective, presents an opportunity to increase the acceptance of burden-
sharing.
The change in risk has been most dramatic in Germany and Japan. The
Basic Law of Germany expressly provides that it is not a country of
immigration," 2 and the nation's history prior to 1989 was consistent with this
tenet. Beginning in 1989, however, a huge influx of asylum seekers into
Germany"' dramatically challenged this tradition. Immigration and refugee
policy has become a central issue in German politics. With restrictionist parties
gaining ground, Germany amended its Basic Law in 1993 to limit severely
asylum seekers' rights. Despite these efforts, however, the number of asylum
seekers in Germany remains quite large. 4
Like Germany, Japan has only recently begun to consider seriously the
need to fashion an immigration and refugee policy. 5 Although it still receives
few refugee claims, they are increasing-as is the number of foreigners, legal
and illegal, living in Japan.11 6 Perhaps more important, Japan is experiencing
112. See Rainer Munz & Ralf Ulrich, Changing Patterns of German Immigration, 1945-1994, in
MIGRANTS PAST, MIGRANTS FUTURE: GERMANY AND TrE UNITED STATES (Klaus Bade & Myron Weiner
eds., forthcoming 1997). The Aussiedler, people of German ancestry whose families have lived in eastern
Europe, often for centuries, are not really exceptions, as they are considered German by blood and culture
and are permitted to acquire German citizenship more or less automatically upon their return to Germany.
See id.
113. Munz and Ulrich provide the statistics. See id.
114. The total in 1994 was 127,000, well below the 438,000 who applied in 1992. See id.
115. Like Germany's willingness to accept Aussiedlers, Japan now accepts nikkeUin, people of
Japanese ancestry living abroad, many of them in South America. See Myron Weiner, Opposing Visions:
Migration and Citizenship Policies in Japan and the United States, in TEMPORARY WORKERS OR FUTURE
CITIZENs? JAPAN AND U.S. MIGRATION PoucIEs (M. Weiner & T. Hanami eds., forthcoming 1997).
116. See id. at 10 tbl.1. The Japanese Justice Ministry estimated that there were 285,000 foreigners
living illegally in Japan in 1995. See Japan's Foreign Residents and the Quest for Expanded Political Rights,
JEI REP., July 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (noting continuing hostility to
foreigners and immigration); see also Mayumi Itoh, Japan's Abiding Sakoku Mentality, ORBIs, Mar. 22,
1996, available in 1996 WL 13459521 (noting that, as of January 1995, approximately 1.6 million
foreigners resided in Japan). Notwithstanding Japanese resistance to increasing numbers of foreign residents,
a looming labor shortage may necessitate more immigration. See Japan's Foreign Residents and the Quest
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growing concerns about potential political convulsions in China, Hong Kong,
and North Korea that could quickly send millions of refugees streaming across
the short distance that separates Japan from mainland east Asia.
1 7
For states like Germany, previously protected by the Iron Curtain but now
a country of first asylum on a massive scale, and Japan, no longer protected by
its geography from becoming a first-asylum state, the strategic implications of
their new vulnerability are immense. No longer can they simply free ride on
other states' policies of refugee control and management to protect them from
major influxes into their own territories. Indeed, states' new interdependence
goes beyond this; historically insular states are now more likely to face refugee
flows resulting from the restrictive practices of other states. 18
Thus, states previously at low risk of becoming first-asylum countries may
now find a cooperative strategy far more attractive than they would have only
a few years ago. Under this refugee-crisis insurance approach, all states arrange
to bear some refugee protection burdens so that none will be saddled with a
refugee crisis that it must bear alone. The German and Japanese experiences
can serve as vivid lessons for other states that have resisted burden-sharing in
the belief that they are still immune from large refugee flows.
The incentives for burden-sharing based on motives other than fear of
becoming a first-asylum state remain weak in most regions. The traditional
willingness of many sub-Saharan African states, with UNHCR assistance, to
offer temporary protection to refugees from neighboring countries is the
greatest exception. Pakistan's protection of millions of Afghani refugees during
the 1980s is another, although pressure and aid from the United States were
instrumental in eliciting this response. Once we move beyond temporary
protection to permanent resettlement, as noted above, only Scandinavia, the
United States, Canada, and a few other states offer it to a significant number
of refugees.
Precisely because the altruistic motives for burden-sharing are so weak,
these powerful states have strong reasons to induce others to cooperate by
manipulating the formidable carrots and sticks that the powerful states control.
In the past, these states, actuated by a combination of humanitarian and deeply
self-interested motives, have managed to persuade recalcitrant first-asylum
states like Thailand, Hong Kong, and Pakistan to protect temporarily (although
the period often proved to be quite protracted) refugees on their territories." 9
for Expanded Political Rights, supra; Migration Issues in APEC, ASIAN MANAGER, Jan. 1, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 10097043.
117. See Weiner, supra note 115; see also Andrew Pollack, Beckoning Foreign Investors, North
Korea Opens the Door a Crack, to Capitalism, N.Y. TImas, Sept. 19, 1996, at D1 ("Some experts fear that
North Korea could collapse, sending millions of refugees streaming to South Korea, China and Japan.").
118. This occurred most dramatically whenever Thailand, Hong Kong, and other first-asylum states
for Indochinese refugees engaged in pushbacks or announced new restrictions, thereby channeling the
refugee flow to Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Australia, and other potential havens in the region.
119. During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the states of the European Union pressed Croatia
and Slovenia, first-asylum states for refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, to maintain the refugees there
rather than diverting them westward. Croatia and Slovenia did so, incurring large fiscal and domestic
political costs. See Thorbur, supra note 84, at 473-76.
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As international economic developments improve industrialized states' leverage
over first-asylum states with respect to trade concessions, technical assistance,
and access to financial and other support, this approach, which entails the
tactical use of political pressure, negotiation, and resource transfers, may bear
additional fruit.
The success of a proportional burden-sharing system depends critically on
the relatively powerful states' ability to use this leverage more skillfully and
forcefully to induce broader participation in the system as refugee flows
increase. This is likely to be most practicable in a regionally-organized
system." In any event, one should recall that the current system of protection
is equally dependent on the more powerful states exercising leverage and
transferring resources to persuade the weaker first-asylum states to harbor
refugees. A proportional burden-sharing system can only improve the chances
that such influence would be effectively deployed.
This examination of the structure of incentives for refugee burden-sharing
does not at all minimize the political obstacles that would impede its
implementation, but it provides some hope that the prospects for gaining
broader agreement on a more robust burden-sharing norm could improve in the
future. The next question is: What should be the actual content of that norm?
The norm should express a principle of fairness in the distribution of
refugee protection burdens. Specifically, it should satisfy three criteria of
fairness: consent, broad participation, and proportionality.
Consent is essential. No state should be obliged to participate in the
burden-sharing scheme unless it voluntarily undertakes to do so. This is a
concession not only to practical politics but also to a concern that states both
feel a genuine commitment to the enterprise and take responsibility for its
success or failure. As the discussion immediately above suggests, a state may
consent for a variety of reasons. Its consent is not ordinarily vitiated by the fact
that it feels constrained to participate because of pressures exerted by other,
more powerful states. States in the international system routinely deploy carrots
and sticks in order to influence the decisions of other states and actors; only in
the most extreme case would such inducements amount to duress negating
consent.
Broad participation in a proportional burden-sharing scheme by consenting
states is justified on the basis of each state's membership in an international
community, which entails certain minimal rights and obligations defined by
international law, including the duty to protect refugees. If the scheme is
carried out on a regional basis, as I propose, participation is likely to be
widespread, if not universal, within that region because of the more firmly
entrenched patterns of intraregional influence and the relative homogeneity of
120. In Africa, the Organization of African Unity might constitute such an organization.
Alternatively, South Africa, which is the continent's wealthiest state and has become a major destination for
refugees, might lead such an effort.
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wealth and values within regions.'21 A broadly participatory arrangement has
several advantages: It minimizes each state's burden by distributing it among
many states, and it overcomes the free rider and adverse selection problems by
making it very difficult for states to opt out. Consequently, it eliminates the
demoralization that participants experience when they perceive that they have
been "suckered" by the defection of others."
The proportionality principle is both a norm of fairness and a constraint
dictated by political prudence. It demands that a state's share of the burden be
limited to its burden-bearing capacity relative to that of all other states in the
international community. Rough proportionality is probably essential to both
consent and broad participation. Taken together, these three values imply a
norm that all states in a region must shoulder some of the burden but that none
must shoulder a burden that it cannot in fairness bear.
B. The Needs Assessment Process
In order to allocate the burden of refugee protection, we must first consider
how the overall burden is to be defined, determined, and used as the basis for
assigning quotas.
The overall burden is defined as the number of refugees who need to be
offered protection-either temporary refuge or permanent resettlement-during
a given time period. This number would be calculated by an international
agency to be described below," and would be adjusted as unanticipated refugee
emergencies occurred. Suffice it to say here that the agency must be equipped
to conduct the necessary investigations, make the requisite factual findings,
administer and enforce the quotas, and regulate the quotas market with due
regard to changing circumstances.
Two difficult, inevitably controversial issues are embedded in this
definition: the number of people seeking protection who are to be treated as
refugees, and the number of those refugees who need either temporary
protection or permanent resettlement (rather than immediate repatriation). Both
issues, however, already arise under the current system and can be resolved,
as they are now, through a combination of factual analysis, calculated
conceptual ambiguity, and old-fashioned negotiation. As a formal matter, the
first issue-refugee status-is a legal one requiring application of the refugee
definition under the Convention or its domestic law equivalent."24 To varying
121. The qualifier "relative" is important, as the examples of impoverished Haiti and communist
Cuba in the North American-Caribbean region demonstrate.
122. As discussed infra in text accompanying notes 136-37, the principle of broad participation in
this context should be subject to two exceptions.
123. See infra Section V.E.
124. The Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994), defines "refugee" as a person with
a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." This definition does not include "any person who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person" on account of the same factors. Id. This
mirrors the definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art.
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extents in different states, asylum adjudications exhibit such formalism. 15 In
contrast, decisions about which individuals are to be temporarily or
permanently protected are relatively ad hoe; they focus less on the legal refugee
definition than on the number of people that the protecting state can handle and,
in the case of resettlement, on the putative refugee's social and political
acceptability to the receiving state. Accordingly, many of those selected for
temporary or permanent protection would probably fail to qualify as refugees
in the more legalistic setting of asylum adjudication. This practice suggests that
the international agency can resolve the issue of refugee status for purposes of
this scheme through the relatively informal, low-cost modalities that UNHCR,
the first-asylum states, and other states (often with the assistance of NGOs) now
use to make protection decisions. 126
The agency must then calculate a world-wide total of refugees who need
temporary protection and a total of those who need permanent resettlement, and
then allocate those totals among participating states by assigning a quota to
each. The notion of "need" that must inform such a calculation is bound to be
controversial. To some extent, need is in the eye of the beholder, as evidenced
by the frequent disagreements that now arise over this issue between (and
within) UNHCR, potential protecting states, and NGOs.127 Under the current
system, UNHCR determines how many slots are needed and proceeds to solicit
offers from states that it thinks can be persuaded to offer protection. In resisting
these entreaties, states may dispute UNHCR's assessment of need, as well as
assert their inability to accept more refugees. If further negotiations ensue, the
parties may articulate competing conceptions of need; hopefully, some
agreement on numbers (if not on the underlying conceptions) may be reached.
Under the proposal, the agency would proceed in a similar fashion. The
stakes in its needs assessments, however, would be much higher than they are
now because the assessments would generate the overall numbers to determine
each state's binding quota. For this reason, it would be essential for the agency
to render its needs assessments more transparent and to establish procedures
enabling states to contest the findings on which their shares would be premised.
1, para. A(2). Section 604 of IIRIRA in effect narrows the refugee definition by barring several additional
categories of aliens from applying for asylum. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 604, 110 Stat. 1214
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158).
125. The formalism of asylum procedures differs considerably among countries. The U.S. system
is by far the most formal. See David Martin, The Obstacles to Effective Internal Enforcement of the
Immigration Laws in the United States, in IMMIGRATON ADMISSIONS: THE SEARCH FORWORKABLE PO1CIES
IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note 95.
126. The contrast between the resources expended on formal asylum adjudication and those expended
on actual refugee protection is striking. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 22.
127. See Refugees in Eastern Zaire and Rwanda: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Int'l
Relations, Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights, 105th Cong. (1996), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Cngtst File (statement of Roger P. Winter, Dir. U.S. Comm. for Refugees) (noting wide disparities
in refugee numbers); Thomas W. Lippman, Governments, Aid Groups Divided over Refugee Crisis in Zaire,
WASH. PoST, Nov. 22, 1996, at A41 ("Some relief organizations accused the Clinton administration of
playing down the crisis to wiggle out of its commitment to send troops for an international military rescue




Both needs assessments and procedures for challenging them are common in
many areas of social policy and administrative law. Their design in the
protection context should pose no special difficulties, other than the political
ones owing to the weaker enforcement mechanisms in the international realm
and the delays that such challenges might entail. The current system elides
enforcement problems, of course, but only because it relies entirely on
voluntary protection offers extended by a relatively small number of states.
The agency's determination as to how many people need only temporary
protection and how many instead need resettlement is, of course, a very
difficult one, requiring much information that is hard to obtain and even harder
to verify, as well as predictions that may be little more than educated guesses.
For the same reason, the line between temporary and permanent refuge is not
easily maintained; as with the TPS Salvadorans," many refugees cannot be
repatriated by the protecting state despite its energetic efforts to do so.
Again, it is important to recognize that the current system must make the
same kinds of difficult determinations so that UNHCR can plan the allocation
of its limited resources and negotiate with potential protecting states. An
additional advantage of a burden-sharing system, however, is that those
states-fearing that erroneous predictions and determinations could leave them
with more (or more permanent) refugees than they initially bargained
for-would have strong incentives to ensure that the determinations are
accurate, that other participating states bear their fair shares and minimize the
necessity for permanent resettlement, and, most importantly, that temporary
protection does not become permanent without the state's genuine consent.
C. The Criteria for Allocating the Protection Burden
In order to implement the proportionality principle discussed earlier, the
quota should be based exclusively on what I shall call the protection criterion,
which is designed to measure the capacity of the state in question to provide
refugees with the most minimal safeguards and amenities to which they are
entitled under the Refugee Convention. They primarily include food, clothing,
shelter, and physical security.129
In the kind of regional, consensual burden-sharing scheme that I propose,
the participating states would of course be free to adopt whatever protection
criterion (or criteria) they preferred. Nevertheless, national wealth is a
compelling index. Protective capacity is largely, though not exclusively, a
function of national wealth. Human rights law aspires to assure refugees the
128. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
129. I emphasize the importance of the minimality of these safeguards and amenities to any realistic
scheme of burden-sharing and protection. Although the ultimate goal is to integrate fully resettled refugees
into the host society once it is concluded that safe repatriation cannot be effected, the initial conditions of
maintenance should maximize the number of people who can be minimally protected for a given
expenditure, rather than protecting fewer refugees at higher levels of amenity. Protection implies safety
before comfort.
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most basic necessities of life and personal security, and a state's wealth is the
single best surrogate for those factors that actually determine its ability to
provide these necessities, directly or indirectly. National wealth is also readily
quantifiable, albeit not without some controversy around the edges, 130 and it is
a factor so closely related to national prestige that states are unlikely to succeed
in minimizing it in a strategic effort to reduce their share of refugee burdens.
Other plausible criteria lack the administrative advantages of a wealth
criterion. Consider the example of assimilative capacity. 3' One might want
states' quotas to reflect their different propensities to assimilate refugees and
other foreigners. The notion of assimilation, however, is notoriously hard to
define or gauge objectively. 13 2 Indeed, the scholars who study it disagree
strenuously about why, how, and when it occurs. 3 3 There are also normative
objections to an assimilation criterion. Although it is highly desirable for states
to facilitate affirmatively the integration of foreigners to whom they offer
permanent resettlement, states are under no international legal duty to assure
them full integration; states are only obligated to provide basic safeguards such
as the right to work and to be free from discrimination.Y3 Full assimilation,
moreover, is fundamentally incompatible with a regime of temporary
protection-relief that states will only provide if they believe that it will
terminate within a reasonably short period of time and thus before full
integration occurs. As noted in Part IV, maintaining the credibility of temporary
protection is essential to the viability of the protection system as a whole.
Finally, a criterion that would enlarge states' quotas if they succeed in
assimilating foreigners would perversely punish states for their openness and
generosity.
The attractiveness of national wealth as the sole criterion for assigning
refugee protection quotas is especially great in a system like the one I propose
here, which would allow a state to pay other states to provide those protection
services that it cannot or will not provide on its own territory. For this reason,
a state's wealth should probably trump other objective factors such as
130. National wealth can be measured in different ways. Some of the many indices include gross
national product, per capita national product, GNP adjusted for quality-of-life or social indicators, potential
wealth, etc.
131. Another example--consideration of a state's own responsibility for refugee flows-would also
be very difficult to apply. Such a criterion would be confounded by all of the notorious complexities and
indeterminacies of social process, historical causation, international morality, and international politics.
132. One might try to devise measures of assimilation based on indices of ethnic conflict within
particular societies, patterns of in- and out-migration, levels of political and social participation by minority
groups, naturalization rates, and the like. Even if such measures could be compiled, they would be so crude
as to be unacceptable to the states involved.
133. See, e.g., Richard D. Alba, Assimilation, Exclusion, or Neither? Models of Incorporation of
Immigrants in the United States, in THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
(Peter Schuck & Rainer Munz eds., forthcoming 1997) (discussing different models).
134. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 3 ("The Contracting States shall apply the
provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.").
Most rights conferred by the Convention are not mandatory upon contracting states, see supra note 21 and
accompanying text, and contracting states are only required "as far as possible" to "facilitate the assimilation
and naturalization of refugees," 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 34. This fact reduces the force
of the displacement of voluntarism objection. See infra Part VI.
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population density and land mass. Although these factors may well affect the
ease with which a state can protect or resettle refugees on its own territory,
these factors are probably best taken into account as they are reflected in the
prices that states are willing to pay to transfer their burden to other states. For
example, Malaysia and Singapore are countries of relatively great wealth but
with high population densities, small land mass, and severe ethnic tensions that
refugees might further inflame. These countries would be assigned large quotas
but would probably offer a high price to shift the protection burden elsewhere.
Two exemptions from the quota system should be provided, and neither is
likely to be controversial in practice. First, no quota should be assigned to a
state that engages in systematic violations of human fights, nor should such
states be permitted to purchase other states' quotas. Although the reason for this
principle is obvious, some objections to it are also obvious. Applying the
criterion in a world in which the number of repressive states remains tragically
large would require some elusive and morally dubious distinctions. A few
relatively easy cases exist (Iraq and North Korea, for example), but the
gradations of brutality between these and many other regimes are subtle, and
line-drawing will surely be both difficult and controversial. Furthermore, that
states will view participation in the protection quota system as a burden rather
than a benefit creates a perverse incentive: The exemption, by relieving states
of a burden, could seem to reward human rights violations and hence encourage
them. Although a state could only qualify for the exemption by being labeled
as a human rights violator, this obloquy, which already attaches to such states,
has manifestly failed to reform their odious conduct and is even less likely to
do so when asserted as part of a refugee protection scheme.
In the context of the regional, consensual arrangement that I propose, this
perverse incentive would be irrelevant. In such a scheme, the regional powers
would have to agree on which states would participate and under what
conditions. The regional leaders would surely be under great internal and
external pressure to exclude the worst human rights violators.136 Dissenting
135. Multi-factor criteria could certainly be devised. In connection with the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, for example, Germany proposed a formula for allocating protection burdens among the
European Union states. According to Joanne Thorburn, the proposal was
based on the size of the population of Member States, the size of their territory and the amount
of their Gross Domestic Product, all as a percentage of the Union total, leading to figures
guiding the percentage number of people from a mass influx of displaced persons which each
State should take. This indicative figure would be modified according to the Member State's
contribution to peace-keeping forces and its particular use of foreign and security policy
measures in the country of origin. The reaction from other Member States was sceptical, not
surprisingly since the proposing State is the one whose burden would be relieved by the
institution of such a mechanism, whereas others would find themselves faced with more persons
in need of protection.
Thorburn, supra note 84, at 476 (footnote omitted).
136. It is true, as Joan Fitzpatrick observes, that even human rights violators "may in fact be safe
harbors for certain groups of refugees." Letter from Joan Fitzpatrick, Professor, University of Washington,
to author 1 (June 27, 1996) (on file with author). She mentions Zaire and the Rwandan Hut, and Iran and
the Iraqi Kurds as examples. Id. Whether such states could participate would be a matter for the regional
groups to resolve.
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states need not join, and the rogue states themselves would hardly complain
about being exempted from burden-sharing obligations.
The second exception should be for states whose wealth falls below some
minimal level, as determined by international agencies.' 37 Again, the
justification is obvious: If such states cannot assure basic sustenance to their
own people, they can hardly provide effective protection to strangers. This
second exemption can overlap with the first, as demonstrated by the example
of Haiti, which is both destitute and a persistent human rights violator.
Apart from these two exemptions, temporary adjustments to a country's
wealth-driven quota may be the best that the system can manage by way of
further refining the criterion. Certain exigent conditions substantially impairing
a state's ability to accept or pay for refugee protection-for example, a state of
war or natural disaster-might justify a temporary quota reduction or even a
suspension. For similar reasons, the system should reduce a state's quota to
reflect the number of refugees who are already on its territory and to whom it
offers either asylum or temporary protection of a specified duration. Such a
credit, and the incentives that it creates for the receiving state, would also
minimize the emotional and economic costs of moving refugees, who have
already suffered at least one dislocation, from an asylum state to another
state. 13
8
If such temporary quota adjustments were permitted, of course, states
would press hard to obtain relief under them. Each adjustment, moreover,
would entail vexing definitional and measurement problems.'39 Refinement of
the quota system through adjustments of this kind, then, would inevitably
increase the administrative complexity of the system.
D. A Market in Refugee Protection Quotas
Would states be interested in paying others to protect refugees? The short
answer is that they already are doing so. In some refugee crises like Rwanda,
137. The United Nations Development Programme compiles cross-national indices on wealth in its
Human Development Index. U.N. DEv. PRoGRAmmE, HumAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 15-22 (1995)
[hereinafter HuMAN DEvELopmENT REPORT] (measuring factors such as life expectancy at birth, educational
attainment, including adult literacy and school enrollment, and income); see also Barbara Crosette, U.N.
Documents Inequities for Women as World Forum Nears, N.Y. TIM, Aug. 18, 1995, at A3.
138. The regional character of the proposed burden-sharing scheme encourages consideration of such
factors. For example, if refugees are to be temporarily protected or permanently resettled, it is clearly
preferable to do so in the region from which they came, other things being equal. The operation of the
quotas market is likely to reinforce the salience of this neighborhood factor by providing a premium to states
for taking refugees who can more easily be returned once the need for protection ceases. Robert Ellickson
has suggested a higher quota for neighboring states on the theory that they are likely to have the greatest
influence over most of the conditions that spawn refugee crises nearby; increasing their quotas to reflect this
factor, he argues, will strengthen their incentives to prevent those conditions from producing refugee flows.
Interview with Robert C. Ellickson, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, in New Haven, Conn. (Feb. 19,
1996).
139. For example, crediting a state's quota to reflect its protection of those refugees who are already
on its territory might require distinguishing between refugees and ordinary immigrants. In countries like the




some relatively wealthy states contribute funds to the first-asylum state to
support its protection efforts in situ. Although these delegations of protection
resources and responsibilities are certainly better than nothing, they suffer from
a number of limitations. The delegation transactions are inevitably ad hoc, with
each transaction having to be organized and coordinated by UNHCR, a
dedicated but sluggish and highly politicized bureaucracy. They invite strategic
behavior by states with conflicting interests hoping to free ride on the efforts of
others.
A market system cannot eliminate these conditions, but it can hope to
leverage certain constraints on refugee protection into an improved system. Just
as increasing refugee flows, by exposing even traditionally insular states to the
risk of sudden influxes, might encourage them to participate in the system of
refugee protection, a market system might transform two other real-world
constraints into important refugee policy virtues. First, state actors are
motivated largely by their perceptions of national self-interest, broadly defined;
they are unlikely to adopt humanitarian policies that are inconsistent with those
perceptions. Second, states vary enormously in both the attitudes and the
resources that they bring to refugee policy. A few states willingly devote
substantial resources to refugee protection while other states do little but pass
the buck.
Although reformers cannot count on changing either states' motivations or
states' heterogeneity, they can devise mechanisms to guide states' self-interest
into channels conducive to humanitarian goals. These mechanisms can
encourage states to exploit their heterogeneity through exchanges that serve
both their self-interest and the public interest in refugee protection. A properly
regulated market in refugee protection quotas promises to accomplish both of
these ends.
Once a state receives its quota, it must decide whether it will discharge it
by offering protection to refugees (either temporary safe haven or permanent
resettlement) on its own territory and, if so, which form of protection it will
provide. It must then identify the particular refugees whom it will protect. In
addition to domestic political considerations, this selection process now entails
a number of interactions-interviews, investigations, consultations, and
negotiations-with UNHCR, other potential receiving states, the first-asylum
state, NGOs, and of course the particular refugees who are candidates for
protection.
Under my proposal, the state would have an additional option. Rather than
protect the quota refugees itself (presumably, but not necessarily, on its own
territory), it could transfer part or all of its quota obligation to another state"4
in a voluntary, public transaction. In effect, the transferor state would pay the
transferee state, which might not be a member of the regional burden-sharing
system. The transferor state would be purchasing a discharge of its obligation
from the transferee. The payment presumably would take the form of cash, but
140. Or states, since the quota might be fractionated for purposes of trading.
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it could, in principle, be any resources that the transferee values enough to
accept: credit, commodities, development assistance, technical advice,
weapons,' 4' political support, or some combination of these assets.
At first blush, it might seem preferable simply to create a centrally
administered refugee protection fund into which each state would be obliged to
pay a sum equal to its share under the protection criterion. The central authority
would then contract with individual states for protection services. This
approach, however, entails at least two important disadvantages. First, it would
restrict the acceptable currency of trade to cash, thereby limiting the number
and flexibility of possible transactions. The proposed system, in contrast, would
permit a transferee state to accept not only cash but also any other resources,
including political support and other hard-to-monetize assets, that it values more
than cash. Second, a centralized system would be more complex and involve
higher transaction costs than a more decentralized system in which state-to-state
negotiations and transactions would predominate. For these reasons, states are
more likely to accept the burden-sharing norm if it is effectuated through a
market system.
Why might states enter into such transactions? As in any voluntary
exchange, the parties will only do so if the exchange makes each of them better
off, and it is entirely possible that no deals would in fact be struck. Even in this
case, refugee protection would still be better off than under the existing system
because of the quota state's commitment to its initial quota. Here, the transferor
can only induce the transferee to accept the transferor's obligation by paying the
transferee enough to compensate it for the additional burden of accepting the
transferor's quota. This is precisely why interstate heterogeneity, with respect
to both their attitudes toward refugees and their resources for dealing with a
refugee burden, can be a policy virtue.
Consider the example of Japan. Any regional system that included Japan
would certainly assign it a large quota; after all, its people are the eighth
wealthiest per capita in the world and the wealthiest in Asia.' 42 With a
remarkably homogeneous population and no tradition of refugee protection,
immigration, or assimilation of foreigners, Japan would presumably be eager
to purchase a discharge of its large protection obligation from another
country-perhaps Australia, New Zealand, or another Pacific Rim state-and
at a high price, reflecting both its high cost of living and its determination to
maintain its ethnic homogeneity.' 43
Ethnically homogeneous, densely populated, and somewhat xenophobic
states like Japan are not the only ones that might be willing to pay to be relieved
141. The transfer of weapons would be subject, of course, to nonproliferation requirements.
142. See HUMANDEvELoPmENTREPORT, supra note 137, at 19 tbl.l.1. Some small oil countries also
have extremely high per capita wealth. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates ranked third and fourth,
respectively, in real GDP per capita in 1992. See id. at 20 tbl.1.2.
143. See, e.g., Sheryl DuWunn, Japan Worries About a Trend: Crime by Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 1997, at A4 (noting that large relative increase in illegal immigrants from China and immigrant-related
crime "'shakes the very foundation of the Japanese government'").
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of their burdens. The United States in effect did this in response to the 1994
exodus from Cuba when it persuaded Panama and several islands in the region
to accept about 9000 refugees, albeit only on a temporary basis."4 Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia, many European Union nations, Brazil,
and other high-quota states with low population densities and a tradition of
receiving and assimilating refugees and other immigrants would also be
competing in regional or larger markets.
Like all other immigrant-receiving societies, these states are, now facing
strong public pressures to admit fewer refugees and immigrants. A quotas
market would offer them a flexible solution to this political dilemma. It would
enable them to respond to these restrictionist pressures not by reducing the level
of refugee protection that their humanitarian traditions demand but by actually
increasing it. This is because the high-quota states that would likely be
purchasers of quota discharges also have high prices for most commodities,
products, and services that refugees need. The costs per refugee are bound to
be much higher in these states than almost anywhere else in the world.
Refugees are entitled only to basic protection from persecution, not residence
in the society of their choice. Human rights policy should seek neither more nor
less than this.
By facilitating voluntary trades, moreover, the quota market could reduce
the overall cost of the refugee protection system, giving it more "bang for the
buck." First, it would tend to move protection programs from higher-cost states
to lower-cost ones, enabling more refugees to be protected for any given
resource level than under the existing system. Second, by increasing the number
of states in a region that participate in the refugee protection system (as either
buyers or sellers of discharge quotas), the system would reflect in the quota's
market price the costs of shifting refugees from the state of first asylum to
another place; hence, those costs would be minimized. In this way, high-quota
states would seek to discharge their quotas by paying states of first asylum or
neighbors of such states to protect those refugees where they are already
located. Third, the quota price would reflect the risk that protection, initially
meant to be temporary, will evolve into the more costly situations of long-term
custody and permanent resettlement. Thus, transferor states, wishing to
minimize the price they must pay to induce transferees to assume their burden,
would have an interest in maintaining the integrity of temporary protection,
which in turn is essential to the viability of any voluntary refugee protection
system, including the current one.
The other side of the market-potential transferee states-should be
reasonably crowded. All states want, and most desperately need, the hard
currency that the high-quota states would presumably use to pay for their quota
discharges, although transferee states might also value other forms of payment.
Some potential transferee states have not been notably receptive to refugees but
144. See Koh, supra note 85, at 155. According to Bronson McKinley, a senior State Department
official involved in negotiating the agreement with Panama, the cost to the United States was quite high.
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already have ethnically diverse populations and may have vast empty spaces
(and residential controls) for temporary protection or resettlement. Russia and
Brazil are examples. Even a wealthy state with a sizable quota of its own might
nevertheless be willing to accept some additional refugees, especially if its costs
of doing so are fully, or perhaps even more than fully, covered by a transferor's
payment. The state's motive might be humanitarian, ideological, ethnic, or
geopolitical, rather than, or in addition to, the mercenary pursuit of hard
currency. 
145
A potential source of uncertainty in a quotas market is the identity of the
particular refugees who comprise a state's tradable quota. Ordinarily, states
do not accept refugees for temporary protection or resettlement until they have
interviewed them and compiled a more or less particularized dossier. Under the
proposed system, this information might be even more valuable; several states,
not just one, would want it in order to decide whether and at what price to
trade.
States considering whether to buy or sell quotas would seek to use such
information to predict the economic, social, and political effects of such a trade.
Just as states under the current system usually give careful consideration to
precisely which individuals or groups they are being asked to protect, states
under the proposal would pay particular attention to whether they have
historical ties to certain refugees based on language, ethnicity, or other
relationships to the receiving state. They will value whatever data on the
refugees' social class, level of education, ethnicity, age, religion, family status,
and any other demographic variables that may help them predict how quickly
those refugees will assimilate, how productive they will be, which public
services they will consume, and so forth. If states value such information but
cannot obtain it, their costs and risks of trading will increase.
Amassing the information should not be too costly. First-asylum states
already gather enough data to determine refugee status or otherwise decide what
to do with the individual. Moreover, no state will seek information that is not
worth the cost of gathering and assessing it. Refugees may want to limit
uncontrolled access to personal information about themselves, fearing not only
loss of privacy but also reprisals by their state of origin. These concerns can
probably be met through confidentiality requirements. 47
Another problem-that such information lends itself to discriminatory
group judgments by receiving states-seems inescapable. Certainly it exists
under the current system. A state's willingness to accept refugees depends in
145. Germany's willingness to accept hundreds of thousands of Croatian refugees, for example, is
explicable in these terms. If the transaction were "identity-blind," however, certain motivations such as
ethnic commonality would be weakened. This issue is discussed below.
146. The problem arises, of course, with respect to two groups of refugees-those who would
comprise the quota initially assigned to a state and those who would comprise the quotas for which a
potential transferee state might be willing to bargain. An analogy to poorly specified property rights is apt.
147. U.S. law protects the confidentiality of asylum applicants by limiting disclosure of the asylum
application and identifying details. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 (1995). Presumably, regional burden-sharing
arrangements could provide similar safeguards.
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part on how it evaluates the refugees' prospects for early return or, if
resettlement is necessary, for assimilation and productivity in the receiving
state. These evaluations turn on the states' assessments of the demographic
characteristics of different racial and ethnic groups and on the states' historical
ties to those groups.
Although such assessments invite prejudicial and discriminatory judgments
that would be odious in any other context, it is hard to see how they can be
avoided here. Virtually every state that admits immigrants discriminates on the
basis of national origin (source country), social class (skill or educational level),
and ethnicity (family, linguistic, or cultural ties). The relatively few states that
agree to protect refugees engage in a discriminatory selection process in which
they choose how many refugees, and which ones, they will accept.141 The
haggling is particularly intense where permanent resettlement, with its higher
stakes, is proposed.
The political reality is that states would be even more reluctant to accept
refugees for protection if they could not pick and choose in this fashion.
Perhaps they could be induced to agree on a "blind" allocation process behind
a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Would this be preferable? It seems doubtful. The
fact is that certain affinities-religious, linguistic, ethnic, and
occupational-between a receiving state and refugees tend to facilitate larger
quotas, more generous treatment (in the case of temporary protection), and
more rapid assimilation (in the case of resettlement). The proposed burden-
sharing system seeks to make a virtue of this necessity by using a quotas
market, in which such affinities would be reflected in quota prices, to attract
more states and more resources into the vital work of refugee protection.
This issue probably cannot be resolved without further analysis and
experience. The most important empirical question is how specific the
information about the refugees in the quota must be in order to meet the
demands of potential trading states. The answer depends largely on the relative
costs and benefits of obtaining more specific information. Some states might be
satisfied with broad demographic data on group composition; others might insist
on the kind of refugee-specific identifying information that raises confidentiality
and safety concerns. Such preferences probably vary from state to state. 49 A
state's demand for refugee-specific information will also be affected by whether
it offers only temporary protection, in which case particularized information is
less important, or permanent resettlement, in which case the state will usually
require it.
The problem of discriminatory refugee selection is not a new one, and the
proposed burden-sharing scheme should not be faulted for failing to offer a neat
148. At the time of this writing, the U.S. government is considering the resettlement of Kurdish
refugees from northern Iraq on the basis of whether they previously worked for the United States. See
Steven Lee Myers, U.S. To Help Free Refugees in Iraq, N.Y. TmmS, Sept. 13, 1996, at Al.
149. States may differ in the extent to which they view refugee resettlement as a type of immigration
program in which they make judgments on a highly individualized basis about refugees' assimilability, as
distinguished from more generalized, categorical judgments.
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solution that earlier efforts could not manage to devise. The CPA, the most
comprehensive burden-sharing program yet established, allocated refugees
through a process of intensive negotiation among the participating states in
which certain demographic affinities were informally recognized as legitimate
bases for assigning particular groups of refugees to one state rather than to
another. Although all states would prefer that "their" refugees possess such
affinities, some states were more insistent on them than others. In the end, the
United States was perhaps the least insistent, accepting many refugees whom
other states would not take.
150
E. An International Authority
The proposal entails certain tasks that only an agency can perform. The
agency must gather information about refugee protection needs, assign quotas
to the states, develop policies to facilitate the market in quotas, disseminate
information about market transactions, and deploy whatever authority the states
grant it (or it can muster informally) to ensure that refugees' rights under
international law are fully protected.
Although the states that would establish burden-sharing schemes might
wish to assign these tasks to a new or existing regional agency, UNHCR is an
obvious candidate to carry them out. UNHCR does not now assign quotas or
supervise a market, but it already performs other functions that have allowed
it to amass enormous expertise in refugee protection. There are good reasons,
therefore, to entrust the quota and market responsibilities to UNHCR and to
provide it with the resources and authority necessary to execute them. 151 There
are also reasons to expect that UNHCR's effectiveness would improve under
the proposed scheme, as the participating states would have strong incentives
to strengthen UNHCR's capacity by providing it with adequate resources and
political support. 152
The agency should disseminate information about market transactions, but
it need not otherwise devote much attention to policing them. Sovereign states
should be presumed to be fully capable of protecting their own transactional
interests in this market. What states cannot be relied upon to protect, however,
are the interests of the refugees who enter their territory, which to some degree
conflict with the states' interests in minimizing the burdens of refugee
admissions. Although the states must retain the primary responsibility for the
welfare of those refugees, the agency has crucial roles of advocacy and perhaps
enforcement in pressing the states to observe international legal principles
governing the treatment of refugees. Precisely how the agency plays these roles
150. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
151. The coordinating role of intergovernmental agencies, notably UNHCR and UNDP, has been
very important to the success of burden-sharing arrangements. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 22.
152. This was the case during the CPA, when the United States and other participating states
extended UNHCR's responsibilities to include establishing and administering holding camps. See
Eagleburger, supra note 48, at 69-70.
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depends in part on the formal authority that the agency receives from the states
and the informal leverage that it can generate.
In addition, the agency must help to resolve certain policy issues
surrounding the structure and performance of the quotas market. Two such
issues-applications for temporary quota adjustments and the specificity of the
information about refugees-have already been discussed. Others are certain to
arise. The transactions themselves, however, should be negotiated and
effectuated state-to-state, not through the agency as intermediary.
VI. A RESPONSE TO (ANTIcIPATED) CRmcs
A number of objections to a market in refugee-protection quotas can be
readily anticipated. In this part, I respond to the three most likely ones: (1)
unworkability; (2) quality of protection; and (3) commodification. Each of these
objections raises legitimate concerns. Most of them can be met in the design of
the new system. For a few, doubts do remain. Again, however, these doubts
apply at least as strongly to the existing system.
A. The Unworkability Objection
The first objection proceeds from the argument that the scheme is
politically unacceptable and thus practically unworkable. Agreement among
states is necessary to establish the system, yet states, so the argument goes,
have no incentive to conclude such an agreement because a quota system would
limit the freedom of action that they now enjoy and impose additional burdens
on them. If states actually had the desire to create such a system, they would
already have done so. Furthermore, a system of quotas would be complex and
difficult to administer. Finally, it would be impossible to enforce such a system
in the absence of a central entity possessing the requisite legal authority and
coercive power. No such entity exists in the international sphere. This
unworkability objection really consists of three somewhat distinct points
concerning incentives, administrability, and enforceability. I have already
discussed these to some extent. I shall consider them now in greater detail.
Incentives. The logic of the claim about incentives is contingent on the
circumstances specified by the observer. Any structure of incentives is
inevitably contextual, a function of the conditions and choices that confront the
decisionmaker at a particular point in time.
I have shown that the refugee context is indeed changing in ways that are
altering the objective risks that states face, their perceptions about such risks,
and their policy choices. The key change is the apparently permanent refugee
crisis. No state is wholly immune from this crisis, which is already affecting
how states perceive their risks of becoming a country of first asylum. These
new perceptions, I suggest, should make states more receptive than they have
previously been to a form of burden-sharing, a strategy that I have termed
refugee crisis insurance. Today, even (or perhaps especially) a traditionally
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insular state might rationally prefer to agree in advance to accept a limited
number of refugees in exchange for an assurance that other states will relieve
it of any additional burden in the event of a refugee emergency that suddenly
transforms it into a first-asylum country. Finally, as discussed below, 53 the
states with the greatest stakes in a broader distribution of refugee protection
burdens are precisely the ones that possess the largest stock of carrots and
sticks.
Thus, the incentives to support such a burden-sharing strategy are now in
place. Whether states will in fact act on them, of course, is an entirely different
question; one must never underestimate the durability of old perceptions and
policies. Nevertheless, the refugee pressures that have been building on some
traditionally insular states like Germany, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand,
and the growing sense of urgency-even crisis-among some of these states is
evidence that the new incentives are affecting state behavior. The rise of at least
embryonic regional refugee burden-sharing (and burden-avoiding) arrangements
in Europe" 4 and North America provides additional evidence of such a
transformation. 155
Administrability. It is certainly true that quota systems can be difficult to
operate. They require an administrative agency to resolve a number of
methodological, empirical, and normative questions, to implement the system
in the face of many practical and political obstacles, and to make adjustments
to accoinmodate constantly changing conditions. That the scheme would be
consensual at its inception-that states would participate only if it served their
interests-would reduce, but not eliminate, these obstacles.
The best evidence of such a system's administrability would be the
operation of analogous schemes in other areas of public policy. During the last
decade, many proposals have been made in which a regulatory authority would
permit regulated entities to trade entitlements or obligations as a way to
improve the regulated activity's allocative efficiency.5 6 A few of these
proposals would necessitate international agreements." 7 My proposal for
tradable refugee-protection quotas draws on this approach.
Unfortunately, only a few such trading schemes have yet progressed much
153. See infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
154. See 1985 Schengen Agreement, supra note 8; see also Reerman, supra note 95.
155. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 22.
156. For some examples of this approach, see Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community
Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1561,
1580-92 (1995) (proposing tradable community investment obligations); Edmund L. Andrews, F. C.C. Plan,
with a Twist, To Require Educational TV, N.Y. TuMaS, Apr. 1, 1995, at 38 (proposing tradable children's
educational programming requirements); Peter Passell, A Venerable Peanut Subsidy May Be Target of
Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at D2 (noting plan to make peanut marketing quotas tradable within
counties); Peter Passell, Big Government and the Big 3 Pass the Air Pollution Buck, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 20,
1994, at D2 (proposing tradable auto emission reduction obligations); Peter Passell, One Answer to
Overfishing: Privatize the Fisheries, N.Y. Tmms, May 11, 1995, at D2 (planning to create fishing rights
quotas).
157. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global




beyond the brainstorming stage, and none of them is either fully developed or
entirely analogous to what I am proposing here. Nevertheless, two market-
oriented schemes of this general kind, New Jersey's "fair share" affordable
housing program and emissions trading under the Clear Air Act, are of some
interest to refugee-policy reformers because they rely on assigned quotas, allow
trading of those quotas, and have already been implemented to some extent.
The New Jersey program grew out of an earlier decision by the state
supreme court in the seminal Mount Laurel litigation." 8 There, the court held
that the state constitution required each municipality in the state to provide its
fair share of affordable housing to people of low and moderate income. The
state subsequently enacted a statute'1 9 to systematize these obligations and
established a Council on Affordable Housing to implement the fair-share
scheme. As part of this scheme, now municipalities may, under certain
circumstances, enter into regional contribution agreements (RCAs) in which
municipality A pays municipality B to discharge up to 50% of A's fair-share
obligation. RCAs, it was hoped, would encourage rehabilitation of the existing
and often substandard housing stock in the central cities."6
As implemented, the New Jersey scheme can hardly be said to be an
unqualified success; commentators have given it mixed reviews, including some
harsh criticism.16' Although a number of RCAs have been concluded, they
apparently provide for only a modest number of housing units, 62 and this seems
to be true of the fair share program as a whole. Much of the difficulty stems
from disputes over the fair shares and from the ease with which developers and
municipalities can circumvent program requirements. 16
Another market-oriented system that is already in place is emissions trading
under the 1990 Clear Air Act amendments." 64 Under this program, utilities that
reduce their emissions below a prescribed level may, under certain
circumstances, either "bank" the excess reductions for their own future use or
sell them as allowances to other utilities that face higher abatement costs. As
with New Jersey's fair share program, the reviews of emissions trading are
mixed. In contrast to the New Jersey program, however, virtually all
commentators endorse the policy of emissions trading and agree that the savings
in regulatory compliance costs have already been substantial. The main
criticism seems to be that the program has failed to realize its full potential,
158. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983);
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
159. Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
160. See JEssE Dummmm & JAMES I. KRmR, PROPERTY 1126 (3d ed. 1993).
161. Id. at 1127-28 (discussing studies in summary fashion).
162. See NEw JERSEY COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE Hous., STATUS OF MUNicnMALrrms, 1989-1999
(1997).
163. For a discussion of the outcome of the Mount Laurel case, see Ronald Smothers, After Landmark
Ruling, Slow and Painfid Progress, N.Y. TimS, Mar. 3, 1997, at BI; Ronald Smothers, Decades Later,
Town Considers Housing Plan for the Poor, N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 3, 1997, at B5; Ronald Smothers, Mt.
Laurel Votes To Build Homes for the Poor, N.Y. TImS, Apr. 12, 1997, at Bi.
164. 1990 Amendments to Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 401-413, 104 Stat. 2399,
2584-635 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1994)).
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largely because of market and regulatory uncertainty that discourages more
extensive trading. 65 Efforts are afoot to broaden the use of emissions-trading
mechanisms-extending into the international arena."
It is hard to know precisely what lessons, if any, refugee-policy reformers
should draw from the experiences of the domestic housing and emissions
control programs and the emerging international environmental accords. These
programs are similar to a refugee-quota scheme in a few respects but different
in many others.
All of these market-based schemes impose obligations and then permit the
obligors to trade those obligations to others. Each is designed to derive greater
social benefit (affordable housing, pollution control, refugee protection) from
a given level of resources. Each seeks to take account of the heterogeneity
among the obligors (communities, polluters, and countries) and to turn it to
social advantage. Both the New Jersey program and my refugee quota proposal
are based on still-controversial norms of equitable burden-sharing, although
they concern radically different goods (housing and protection from
persecution) that are allocated in altogether different ways. In the housing
program, both quota allocation and compliance measurement are plagued by
definitional problems.
These problems, however, might not hobble a refugee-quota scheme in
which strict legal definitions of "refugee" are of less practical importance.167
Such a scheme, moreover, may not require the kind of complex technocratic
knowledge that pollution-control agencies must possess in order to administer
an emissions-trading system effectively.
Enforceability. Once states agree to participate in a refugee-quota scheme,
monitoring compliance should not be particularly difficult, as UNHCR can
readily count refugees, verify their destinations, and record transactions among
states. Enforcement, however, would be far more problematic. Subscribing
states would presumably have the same mixed motives to comply as they do in
the case of other treaty obligations. These motives balance a desire to sustain
a scheme of international cooperation to which they have agreed and that they
165. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-30, AIR POLLUTION: ALLOWANCE
TRADING OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY To REDUCE EMISSIONS AT LESS COST, ch. 3 (1994), available at
http:lfrwebgate.access.gpo.govlcg.. .xt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L.
Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361,401-06 (1989); Peter
Passell, Illinois Is Looking to Market Forces To Help Reduce Its Smog, N.Y. IMES, Mar. 30, 1995, at D2
(noting that environmentalists believe program has succeeded beyond expectations).
166. See, e.g., DANIELDUDEK&JONAT-ANWINER, OECD, JoINTIMPLEMENTATION,TRANSACTlON
COSTS, AND CLmIATE CHANGE (1996); Daniel Dudek et al., Technology-Based Approaches Versus Market-
Based Approaches, in GREENINGINTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (Phillippe Sands ed., 1993) (discussing voluntary
Climate Control accord); Stephen Kinzer, U.S. Utilities Helping Czechs To Curb Greenhouse Gases and
Air Pollutants, N.Y. Twors, Sept. 18, 1995, at A8 (noting that utilities anticipate "joint implementation"
law allowing domestic pollution credits for achieving pollution reductions abroad); Peter Passell, For
Utilities, New Clear-Air Plan, N.Y. TIm, Nov. 18, 1994, at D1 (suggesting that transaction between
Arizona and New York utilities may lead to global market system); Peter Passell, Yawn. A Global-Warning
Alert. But This One Has Solutions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at D2 (describing international emissions
trading system to reduce greenhouse gases).
167. For discussion of refugee definitions, see supra notes 1, 19.
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believe furthers their national interest, and a desire to win or retain the
approbation of actual or potential trading partners and politico-military allies,
against a desire to free ride and retain their autonomy.
As with other international agreements, enforceability will depend largely
on the degree to which powerful states wish to see the system implemented and
are prepared to press other states to comply. I have argued that in this case,
those with the greatest stakes in the scheme's success are the states that now
feel obliged to accept refugees for permanent resettlement, as well as certain
other nonresettlement states like Japan that might value refugee crisis insurance
nonetheless. Happily, these are also the states that possess the most powerful
levers for securing compliance with the quotas. Whether they would in fact use
their influence for this purpose, of course, is a separate question. Once again,
however, it is worth emphasizing that international cooperation is no less
essential to the effectiveness of the current system.
I have proposed that the burden-sharing system initially be established on
a regional basis. Participation by more states would of course be desirable and
should be a goal for the future, but a scheme developed by a small number of
powerful states in a region would, as noted earlier, have distinct advantages.
These states could establish whatever conditions and criteria they deem
necessary to protect their vital national interests. These interests would surely
include their desire to discourage free rider behavior by other, nonparticipating
states by penalizing their recalcitrance and rewarding their cooperation. If the
scheme were successful-if it managed to diffuse refugee crises and to
distribute protection burdens more broadly and fairly-other states might wish
to join this market or to form markets of their own, thereby gradually enlarging
the pool of burden-sharing states.16
I have also proposed that the new system of refugee protection be
consensual, a feature of the current system and indeed of almost all
collaborations in the international sphere. Today, states decide to protect
refugees if and to the extent that they wish, for their own reasons, to do so.
This is not to say, of course, that they enjoy complete freedom of action.
Receiving states decide to protect refugees only after balancing a variety of
considerations, including the seriousness with which they regard their
obligations under the Refugee Convention. Some of their reasons are
humanitarian; 169 others are not. Some states may conclude that they have little
choice but to acquiesce in other states' requests to participate, backed up by
positive or negative inducements. The proposed system would be no different.
Indeed, I have just suggested that its viability depends on the willingness of
powerful receiving states to deploy these inducements, if necessary, in order to
enforce the quotas.
168. For a similarly incremental approach to an incomplete market in climate change risks, see
THOMAS C. Hm-LLR, JoINT IMPLEMENTATION AND THE PATH TO A CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 11-14 (Robert
Schuman Centre at the European Univ. Inst., Jean Monnet Chair Paper No. 23, 1995).
169. The Scandinavian countries, for example, do not take in refugees because of U.S. pressure; they
do so out of a long, autonomous tradition of refugee protection.
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B. The Quality-of-Protection Objection
A more serious question relates not to the number of refugees who would
be protected under the proposed system but to the quality of protection that
would be provided in the receiving states. Under the current voluntary system,
receiving states may fail to provide refugees with the full protections to which
international law entitles them. Such failures, of course, are far more common
with respect to the protection of those who claim asylum or other forms of
temporary protection than with respect to resettled refugees, who usually
become eligible for permanent legal status in short order. 170 Even so, it would
not be surprising if states that have traditionally volunteered to protect refugees
tend to treat them better than states that agree to do so for the first time and in
exchange for compensation.
This is a genuine risk, but it is not peculiar to the quota-market proposal.
Indeed, the risk attaches to any move toward more universal burden-sharing
that brings previously nonparticipating states into the refugee-protection system.
There are several techniques for minimizing this risk; they cannot wholly
eliminate it.
First, states that pay others to fulfill their quotas cannot thereby divest
themselves of the duty to ensure that the rights of their quota refugees are fully
protected. They should be under an independent, continuing legal responsibility
to see that the states with which they deal also protect those rights.'7 They
could enforce this responsibility through contractual provisions, liens on
receiving states' assets, and diplomatic remedies.
Second, the payments to the receiving state should not be made through an
initial lump-sum transfer. Instead, the pressure for continuing compliance with
human rights and other obligations can be maximized by making payments on
a periodic basis. Again, the problem of ensuring that resources that the donor
provides for refugee protection are in fact used for that purpose, rather than
being drained off by corruption or inefficient administration, is a ubiquitous
one, especially in the impoverished regions in which many refugee crises arise.
It is not at all peculiar to the proposed burden-sharing scheme.
Third, the administering agency, whether it be UNHCR or another, should
be given wide-ranging authority to monitor and to publicize the treatment of
resettled refugees in light of humanitarian standards. Paying states must ensure
that the agency receives the resources it needs to carry out its essential
monitoring and reporting functions. By drawing more states into the protection
system and by imposing on transferors as well as transferees a continuing
responsibility for the proper expenditure of protection funds, the proposed
system should increase support for the agency's activities.
170. The efforts by Zaire and Burundi to force Hum refugees to return to Rwanda are tragic examples
of the failure to protect those seeking temporary protection. See McKinley, supra note 79.
171. This responsibility could be analogized to a company's continuing liability-imposed by
contract, statute, or common law-for certain risks associated with particular assets it sells to another.
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The proposed expansion of the refugee-protection system beyond the
traditional receiving states raises a related quality problem. The quota transfers
permitted under a market system increase the probability that a refugee will end
up being offered protection in a state in which she simply does not want to be.
The states that the market newly draws into the system are likely to be poorer,
more geographically isolated, ethnically different, and have different social
policies than the traditional receiving states.
A refugee offered protection by a relatively unattractive state is placed in
an unenviable position. She may have few options, all of them undesirable. She
can reject the offer and remain where she is, in perhaps indefinite limbo,
hoping that something better comes along. She can try to return home, which
may be dangerous or even suicidal. Or she can accept the offer and receive
protection in a country in which she thinks she will be unhappy.
Under the current system, a refugee confronts essentially the same options,
with the difference being that there is a higher ex ante probability that the
offering state will be an attractive one in which to live, temporarily or
permanently. The refugee's options are limited because her rights under
international law are limited. She is entitled only to non-refoulement and the
other basic protections accorded by the Refugee Convention. She has no right
to receive those protections in any particular state. Many refugees struggle,
against great odds, to move from the state that initially offered them protection
to one in which they prefer to live. Many succeed in doing so. Refugees,
however, have no rights qua refugees to be protected in one state rather than
in another. To create such a right would certainly reduce the willingness of
states to grant protection, and it is almost inconceivable that the international
community will ever do so.
A system of quotas (marketable or not) is designed to draw more states
into the refugee-protection system and to increase the number of refugees
receiving protection, but the quality of this protection may be reduced if the
newly participating states are permitted to be less hospitable to refugees. This
tension between the total amount of protection (in the sense of the number
receiving it) and the quality of protection enjoyed by those who receive it
transcends the marketable quota proposal; it applies, mutatis mutandis, to any
reform that seeks to broaden refugee burden-sharing.
I believe that the paramount goal for refugee policy should be to maximize
the number of individuals receiving basic protection against threats to their lives
and freedoms. 172 Maximizing the quality of life enjoyed by those who receive
that basic protection is highly desirable, of course, but it remains secondary to
this primary purpose. Those who hold different normative priorities will view
the proposal less favorably, but they will be hard pressed, I believe, to devise
172. This goal is recognized in section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h) (1994), which implements article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Section 243(h) provides that
"the Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien. . . to a country if the Attorney General
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id.
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a better one.
C. The Commodification Objection
A final objection is directed not at the idea of quotas per se but at the moral
implications of a system of marketable refugee quotas. This objection holds that
such a market would allow and encourage states to traffic in human beings-and
desperately vulnerable human beings at that-and that this offends common
morality. 73
For four reasons, my response to this objection is brief. First, the objection
is a familiar one. It is made whenever the market is used to allocate scarce
goods or activities-organ transplants, education, environmental controls,
communications spectra, childbearing, and low-cost housing, to name a few
examples-that have traditionally been allocated, at least ostensibly, through
administrative or other "nonmarket" mechanisms.174
Second, the commodification objection implies that the relevant comparison
is between a callous market-based system that would arbitrarily allocate
refugees to diverse places and fates and a more rational system that allocates
them according to some exalted principle of justice. In reality, of course, the
existing refugee system does not even pretend to approach such an ideal.
Rather, it is a system that-in common practice, if not in law-allows states of
first asylum to decide whether and how to protect the individuals who manage
to reach them and allows a handful of other states to select the small number of
refugees whom they will accept for resettlement, usually based on their
judgments about the refugees' prospects for assimilation. This system leaves the
majority of refugees to languish indefinitely in dehumanizing, squalid camps or
to be repatriated to conditions of possible persecution and almost certain
suffering. Given the harsh reality of a dehumanizing status quo, a
commodification objection to the proposed reform seems quite beside the point.
Third, the proposed system is perfectly compatible with whatever
regulatory protections and market constraints are thought conducive to securing
overriding public values. This is not to say, however, that any such constraint
could be imposed without sacrificing other goals, including states' willingness
to participate in the burden-sharing system. 75 Here, as elsewhere, the market
173. For an elaboration of such an argument in the context of rent control, see Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 -LHxv. L. Rnv. 1849, 1878, 1918 (1987); Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent
Control, 15 PriL. & PUB. AF. 350 (1986). For a response to Radin, see Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control
and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 770-74 (1988).
174. For classic discussions of alternative decision processes for allocating such goods, see GUIDO
CALABRESI & PHILP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); ROBERT A. DAHL & CHAInES LINDBLOM, POLICS,
ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE (1976). The phrase "at least ostensibly" and the scare quotes around
"nonmarket" are intended to convey a recognition that these other processes, including politics and legal
structures, usually conceal rather than eliminate the market's operation. This fact is in accord with public
choice theory and with empirical studies in areas as diverse as campaign finance, interest group behavior,
the regulatory process, judicial elections, and litigation.
175. For example, a requirement that interstate tranactions be "identity-blind," see supra notes
145-48 and accompanying text, might discourage some ethnically homogeneous states from participating.
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exacts its price; there is no free lunch. But it is to say that we can and should
seek an optimal mix of the conflicting values.
Finally, the commodification argument would fail even on its own terms
if the market-based system actually succeeded in protecting more refugees, with
a quality of protection no worse, and at a lower cost, than in the current system.
Although new schemes seldom work exactly as planned, and prudence thus
dictates caution on the part of reformers (including confining the proposal to a
regional, consensual demonstration), I have adduced strong reasons to believe
that the proposed scheme could indeed produce each of these advantages.
VII. CONCLUSION
The need for improved refugee protection is both manifest and growing.
The existing system, jerry-built to address conditions that have changed
dramatically since its inception, exhibits a number of major flaws. At the most
general level, the two most important flaws include a failure to furnish at least
temporary protection to a large number of refugees who desperately need it and
an unfair distribution of burdens among states able to provide protection. The
maintenance of even this unsatisfactory system ultimately depends on the
willingness of the relatively powerful industrial nations to use their
leverage-their array of carrots and sticks-to induce the first-asylum states to
offer temporary protection and, where permanent protection is necessary, to
arrange for a limited number of resettlement slots in their own countries.
Equitable burden-sharing among states is a noble vision but not a new one.
What is required to instantiate it is a system of norms, incentives, and
institutions that can mobilize the necessary protection resources from states that
will always be reluctant to commit them, especially if they believe that the
protection will be permanent, not temporary. No system can eliminate this
reluctance; it is endemic to states' narrow conceptions of their national self-
interest. But the refugee burden-sharing scheme-by proposing a regionally-
based, consensual arrangement combining a quota system that distributes
refugee burdens among the wealthier states with a market option that can
redistribute protection resources to other states that can more effectively use
them to harbor more refugees-promises to increase the overall level and
quality of protection. Like many promises, its hopes might not be fully realized,
but even so it could hardly leave refugees worse off than they are now. In view
of both the deplorable status quo and the potential for human rights gains, can
we afford not to try?
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